180 WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER.—2 BLAND.

correctly to decide upon such objections, proceeding from a party,
because some other testimony, upon which the validity of such an
objection might mainly depend, might not then have been taken
and brought before the Court.

For these reasons, therefore, as in England, where an order has
been passed, which is granted, as of course, for the examination
of a co-defendant as a witness, his examination cannot be sus-
pended * by an objection to his competency, which must be
192 raised at the hearing, when his deposition is offered to be
read in evidence, Lee v. Atkimon, 2 Cox. 413; Murray v. Shadwell,
2 Ves. & Bea. 405; so here, I shall for the future regard if as a
settled principle, governing the practice of this Court, that no ob-
jection coming from a, party to the suit, to the competency of a
witness, or to the relevancy of any interrogatory, or of any testi-
mony, shall be allowed to suspend" or impede the taking of the
proofs. Such objections may, however, be noted by the commis
sioners in their proceedings, as has been the practice heretofore (m;)
and whether so noted or not, they may be made, heard, and de-
termined upon ait the final hearing. Striked Caw, 1 Bland, 96;
Rarwood v. Haneood, 1806, per KILTY, Chancellor. MS.: John-
son v. Berry, 1810, per KILTY, Chancellor, MS.

But if it appears that such an objection has been made, at any
time, previous to the hearing, either before the commissioners,
the auditor, or a justice of the peace, authorized by a special order
to take testimony, it miust be considered as sufficient notice to
put the opposite party upon his guard to meet and repel it,
either by a release at the time, so as then, as in cases at common
law, immediately to remove the influence of interest from the mind
of the witness: or to overcome the objection, if he can, by other
proof. But if no such release be then given, nor other proof be
then taken; and it should appear, at the hearing, that the witness
was interested, the objection must be sustained, and he cannot be
then released and re-examined; nor can the hearing of the case be
postponed for the purpose of taking any other proof, of which the
party had been thus apprised, might he called for; and which it-
had been in his power to have taken and brought in, as it must be

(m) COCKEY v. HAMMOND.—25th of January, 1775.—The plaintiff's second
interrogatory to be asked of Lancelot Todd, is; "Are you to gain or lose any
thing in case the decree in Chancery is for, or against the complainant John
Cockey?-' And then just previous to the heading of the commissioners'
return is the following entry, " Mr. Hammond the defendant, objects to the
testimony of Lancelot Todd, as being interested in the event of the cause;
and, therefore, desires he may not be examined on his interrogatories."
After which, follows Todd's deposition, in which he answers thus, "secondly,
that he was not to gain or lose anything by a decree in Chancery in favor of
the complainant.'' Nothing farther appears in the case, as to this objec-
tion.—Chancery Proceedings, lib. W. K. No. 1. fol. 829.