BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 145

In construing a legislative enactment, a Court of justice cannot
regard the resolutions, orders, or propositions entered upon the
journals of either branch of the legislative department; but must
look to the statute book alone, the words of which must speak for
themselves; nor can it consider the motives which may have influ-
enced the Legislature any further than they are manifested by the
language of the statute itself. A Judge must form his judgment
of the meaning of the Legislature as if the case had been brought
before him by demurrer, in the consideration and determination of
which uo evidence can be admitted; yet, in all such cases he may
well inform himself from dictionaries or books which treat on the
particular subject; in doing so, however, such authorities are not
to be regarded as mere evidence, but only as the grounds of his
judgment, as if he were to cite authorities illustrative of the opinion
he delivers. The King v. Waddington. 1 East, 149, 158; The Attor-
ney-General v. The Cast Plate Glass Company, 1 Anstr. 39; Came-
ran v. Cameron, 7 Cond. Glum. Rep. 374; The People v. Utica Insur-
ance Company, 15 Johns. Rep. 380, 394.

The provisions of the Act incorporating the Chesapeake and
Ohio Canal Company, upon the true construction of which the pre-
sent question tarns, relate only to the termination of a great work
which that corporation is to cause to be executed; and the matter
to be decided is, where that termination was intended to be; or
whether that body politic has been restricted to any given space,
or * place within, or at which their work must terminate.
The great, the sole purpose of this Act is to cause a naviga- 155
ble canal to be made "from the tide of the River Potomac, in the
District of Columbia," over to the River Ohio; and this Act of incor-
poration must be construed with reference to that great object, so
far as regards the matter now under consideration. 1 Blac. Com.
61; New River Company v. Graves, 2 Vern. 431; Curling v. Chalk-
len, 3 M. & S. 510.

The termination, now in controversy, is no otherwise described
than by the expression, "from the tide of the River Potomac, in the
District of Columbia.'7 The tide thus designated is a large space;
and the surveys, which "have been exhibited in this case, demon-
strate that it is perfectly practicable to extend this canal along,
and to terminate it at any one point of the whole of this space of
tide. The canal may be stopped precisely at the head of tide; but
this, it is admitted, would not be altogether correct, or certainly
not for the best. It is said, that it should descend to, and be ter-
minated at good, practicable tide navigation. Again, it is clear,
that the canal may be conducted up the valley of Bock Creek, and
so, round Washington, to the Eastern Branch, and enter the tide
near Bladensburg; or thence, descending along the left bank of
that river, it may unite with the tide opposite or below Washing-
ton. This, however, it is pronounced with one voice, and at once,
10 2 B.