128 BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND.
laid out, were to be made to suit both objects, instead of that one
only, the necessary dimensions for which are specified; that is, if
upon agreement any increase in the specified dimensions of the
canal to answer the additional purpose should be determined upon,
an estimate of the expense was to be made; and "the just propor-
tion of the expenses of making large canals or cuts capable of car-
rying such quantities of water as may be sufficient for the purposes
of navigation, and also for any such water works," as the proprie-
tors of the mill-sites might desire to erect, should be then finally
ascertained. The two purposes were to be answered at once, and
in the beginning by their "making large canals." How large over
and above that which was declared to be sufficient for navigation
alone, is not otherwise specified, than by declaring that it should
be "capable of carrying such quantities of water as may be suffi-
cient for both purposes."
Hence, it is perfectly manifest, that the Legislature had medi-
tated upon the incompatibility of answering the two purposes, of
navigation and mills, to an unlimited extent from the same canals;
and had guarded against it by thus unequivocally declaring that
the canal should be commensurate to both purposes. The Legisla-
ture did not leave it in the power of any proprietor of land, by
withholding his consent, or refusing to enter into a reasonable
agreement to prevent the corporation from making a canal of the
specified dimensions for navigable purposes; for, to meet any such
opposition, it is provided, that a jury may be called and his land
condemned; because the new line of navigation being a highway,
and dedicated to public uses, such condemnation might rightfully
be made, by virtue of that eminent domain, which has been tacitly
conceded to the government over all private property.
But although a great and eminent, balance of good to the public
has authorized the violation of private property under every mode
of government in the world, Godwin's Pol. Just. b. 3, c. 3; yet, in
such cases, even the greatest of despots has been irresistibly struck
with the justice of the demand for an adequate compensation.
Tacitus Ann. b. 1, s. 75. But the construction of mills, the en-
hancement of the value of private property, and the aggrandize-
ment of individuals alone, without any view to the * public
136 good, are certainly not such causes as can alone justify the
exercise of the government's power of eminent domain over the
property of any one. Vattel, b. 1, c. 20, s. 244. And therefore it
was, that no power was given by this law to have any private
property condemned for the use of any mill, or to subserve the
purpose of any water-works, which any individual, for his own
private emolument, might be willing to associate with the canal to
be constructed by The Potomac Company. The additions to the
specified canal for all such purposes, were to be obtained by rea-
sonable agreements, and in no other manner whatever, if they
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