HOFFMAN v. JOHNSON.—1 BLAND. 97
According to the Roman law, a surety was allowed three advan-
tages: 1st, he might compel the creditor to sue the principal debtor
first; 2nd, the creditor might be driven to resort to each surety for
his proportional share only; and 3d, a surety, sued for the whole
debt, might demand of the creditor to transfer ever his actions
against the other sureties, before he was allowed to recover the
* whole from the one sued; that is, to have it placed in his
power, as far as practicable, to obtain reimbursement, by
being clothed with all the powers of the creditor and substituted in
his place. Coop. Just. Inst. G12. These principles and privileges,
it is said, have been substantially adopted by all nations of Europe,
of whose code the Roman law forms the basis; which shows that
they accord very much with natural equity and the common sense
of mankind. Hayes v. Ward, 4 John. C. C. 133. The principles
of equity, of England and of Maryland, although in most respects
substantially the same, are apparently not so broad and indis-
criminate in their application.
In the ordinary case of a money bond, there is no distinction,
upon the face of it, between the principal and the surety, who
being both debtors to the same creditor, a Court of equity will
rarely, if in any case, be induced to make any distinction between
them, as regards their creditor. Being alike his debtors, and
equally bound to him; and the credit having been given to them
all together; equity never interferes with such a contract, so as to
loosen any of its ligatures, unless upon peculiar and strong ground,
Yet, as between themselves, such obligors, without prejudice to
their creditor, may be treated, according to the fact, as principal
and surety, and relieved accordingly. The surety may come into
equity to compel his principal to relieve him of his liability by pay-
ing off the debt; but it is otherwise in the case of a bond of in-
demnity, the legal effect of which is to protect against the conse-
quences of future deficiencies, but not entitle the party to call
for anticipated and precautionary payment, by way of preventing
the risk of his being thereafter damnified. Antrobus v. Davidson,
3 Merir. 578. Hence it evident, that a case can rarely occur,
under a contract in the form of a mere money bond, where one
of the obligors, who may be. in fact, no more than a surety,
can be considered as discharged by reason of the obligee's not
proceeding against his co-obligor; or, merely because of the laches
of the creditor. Ex parte Rushforth, 10 Fes. 411; Coop. Just. Inst.
462, 612.
The principles of law in relation to negotiable and commercial
paper, have arisen out of the peculiar nature and uses of such in-
struments. It has been found, from experience, every where, that
it is of the utmost importance, in commercial affairs, that the
holder of such paper should, without delay, give every one who
has become a surety or endorser, notice of its fate. Hence the
7 1B.
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