88 STRIKE'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

But, it would be altogether without precedent to allow a plaintiff
to split up his claim into parcels, and to bring separate suits for
each, or after he had obtained a decree to add to the amount, and
to eke out his claim indefinitely, by introducing other particulars,
and causes of action of a different description, not mentioned or
alluded to in the pleadings, or sanctioned by the decree, and which
were only noticed in the depositions of some of the witnesses; or
to bring in any additional claim by a mere ex parte petition, filed
after the hearing and decree. If the plaintiffs had other claims
than those mentioned in the pleadings, subsisting at the tune of
filing their bill, which might have been included therein, they should
have had their bill so amended as to have embraced them, and
thereby enabled the opposite party to gainsay them if he could:—
therefore the account of the plaintiffs with John Rogers alone, and
also their claim for costs in the suit against Penelope D. Price,
must both be rejected. Spragg v. Birkes, 5 Ves. 589; 5 Bac. Abr.
668; Purefoy v. Purefoy, 1 Vern. 29; Hutson v. Lowry & Neville,
2 Virg. Cases, 42; 1825, ch. 167; Wallift v. Saville. 2 Lutw. 1536.

The claim of the solicitors, Murray and Rogers, which appears
to have been partially sanctioned by the order of the 9th of January,
1824, may be considered as somewhat in the nature of costs; and
it having been placed by the auditor's report before the party's
other counsel, and all concerned, and no objection having been
made, it would seem now to be proper to allow it entire; and it
may be so stated by the auditor.

There is no evidence, derivable from any competent source,
going to show, that the complainants ever received the money said
to be due on the bonds of a Doctor Harsnip, which were said to
have been in their hands and others:—any discount or deduction
from the claim of the complainants, on that account, must there-
fore be rejected by the auditor.

According to the established usage and practice of the Court,
as has been explained, there are but two modes by which other
creditors can be permitted to come in and participate, in cases of
this sort; they are either by petition, or by filing the vouchers of
their * claims. But the filing of the schedule of an insolvent
96 debtor, certainly cannot, by any strained or liberal construc-
tion of this practice, be considered as the filing of the vouchers of
the claims of all, of any of those creditors, whose names and claims
are stated thereon; and, laying aside the insolvent's schedule in
this case, as furnishing no evidence of the intention of any credi-
tor therein named, to come in and make a claim for any debt, which
he alleged, and was ready to prove was due him, when such sched-
ule was filed, there are but two other creditors, who have made any
show of coming in as other creditors of Rogers; and they are,
Robert Taylor, and the firm of HolJingsworth & Worthington.
Taylor has filed a mere short copy of a judgment, which he obtained