74 STRIKE'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

But, that decree has declared the deeds from Rogers to Strike
" null and void as against the complainants;" it has retained them
as a security for nothing, and in no respect whatever. The seve-
ral parts of that decree must be made to harmonize one with
another. Those deeds which have been so totally annulled, as
81 against the * complainants, cannot, therefore, consistently
with that decree, be allowed to stand a.s mortgages against
them, to secure to Strike either the amount of the improvements,
or the advances in money he has made to Rogers. Upon that
ground Strike cannot stand, because it is completely covered by
the decree. This being the decided opinion of the Chancellor, he
might deem it unnecessary to notice that class of cases which
speak of allowances for improvements and advances made by
actual mortgagees, or by those pseudo purchasers of young heirs
and others, whose conveyances are allowed by special favor, to
stand and be considered as of the nature of mere mortgages. Yet
from the manner In which those cases have been pressed forward,
some further reasons, showing why they are inapplicable to this
case, may be expected.

In this case it must be distinctly and constantly recollected,
that Strike now claims reimbursement for his improvements and
advances, not of Rogers, but out of the proceeds of the property
in question, and against the creditors of Rogers, who are here as
the complainants. All those cases of mortgages and psendo pur-
chases, are governed alike by the same principles of equity. A
separate examination of each of them will therefore be entirely
unnecessary.

In all, the bill is brought by the grantor against the grantee, or
between parties who stand precisely in that relation to each other,
to redeem the mortgaged property, or to set aside a conveyance
which had been improperly or fraudulently obtained. And on the
case being made out by the proofs, the tribunal has uniformly an-
swered to him who asked the relief, "you must do equity before
you shall obtain equity. It is true, you have been imposed upon
and defrauded—but it is no less true, that you have been partially
and in some degree benefited; you have received money from your
opponent; he has permanently enhanced the value of your estate;
refund the money you have received, pay for the increased value
of your estate, and it shall be restored to you; the com eyances of
which you complain shall be annulled; until then they shall stand
as a security for those improvements and advances." Such is the
language of the Chancellor in those cases where he acts under the
influence of the maxim, that he who asks equity must do equity;
and this maxim is sanctioned and illustrated by an almost endless
variety of cases to be found in the books.

But the application of this maxim in these cases, and for the
most part, depends not only upon the immediate relationship be-