642 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

* pounds per annum, for the past year, or so much as has
686 become due and remains unpaid; with legal interest on such

Court of law should invariably be determined, you have fondly introduced
your own unsettled notions of equity and substantial justice. Decisions
given upon such principles do not alarm the public so much as they ought,
because the consequence and tendency of each particular instance is not
observed or regarded. In the meantime, the practice gains ground; the
Court of King's Bench becomes a Court of equity; and the Judge instead
of consulting strictly the law of the land refers only to the wisdom of the
Court, and to the purity of his own conscience/'

Lord Redesdale speaking of the same Judge says, "Lord Mansfield had on
his mind prejudices derived from his familiarity with the Scotch law, where
law and equity are administered in the same Courts, and where the distinc-
tion between them which subsists with us ia not known, and there are many
things in his decisions which shew that his mind had received a tinge on
that subject not quite consistent with the Constitution of England and
Ireland in the administration of justice. It is a most important part of that
Constitution, that the jurisdictions of the Courts of law and equity should
be kept perfectly distinct: nothing contributes more to the due administra-
tion of justice. Arid though they act in a great degree by the same rules,
yet they act in a different manner, and their modes of affording relief are
different; and any body who sees what passes in the Courts of justice in
Scotland, will not lament that this distinction prevails. But Lord Mansfield
seems to have considered, that it manifested liberality of sentiment to en-
deavor to give the Courts of law the powers which are vested in Courts of
equity; that it -was the duty of a good Judge amplicare jurisdictionem. This
I think is rather a narrow view of this subject; it is looking at particular
cases rather than at the general principles of administering justice, observ-
ing small inconveniences and overlooking great ones."—Shannon v. Brad-
street. 1 Sch. & Lefr. 06; SugJen's Letters. 4.)

As has been observed in relation to this matter by our own great sage,
"the only natural improvement of the common law, ia through its homo-
genous ally, the Chancery, in which new principles are to be examined,
concocted, and digested. But when, by repeated decisions and modifica-
tions, they are rendered pure and certain, they should be transferred by
statute to the Courts of common law and placed within the pale of juries."
(4 Jeff. Corr. let. 104.) And in relation to those alterations of our Code, so
frequently made by the most crude and ill-digested scraps of legislative
enactment, he observes, that "the instability of our laws, is really an im-
mense evil. I think it would be well to provide in our Constitutions, that
there shall always be a twelvemonth between the engrossing a bill and pass-
ing it; that it should then be offered to its passage without changing a word;
and that if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage,
it should take two-thirds of both houses, instead of a bare majority."—(2
Jeff. Corr. let. 117.)

In these points of view then, a Court of Chancery is not only a useful,
but an indispensable part of our judicial system. And, when the proper
judicial duties of a Chancellor are thus compared with those of a Judge of
a Court of common law; and especially with those which are, alone, properly
assignable to a Court of the last resort, it cannot fail to strike every one,
that those of a Chancellor, independently of all his other irregular and inci-
dental duties, must require a vast deal more skill and labor than those of a
common law Judge in any situation whatever; and that the larger amount