640 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—I BLAND.

was thus led to believe, publicly and solemnly pledged to whoever
should be appointed Chancellor. May he now be permitted, re-
spectfully' to ask—has that faith been kept!

time to prepare his defence, and to have the merits of his case deliberately
discussed in the Court of first resort; and that so many limitations and
checks have been imposed upon the range of the right of appeal.

Considering these as the true causes of greater salaries having been
always given to the Judges of the Courts of original jurisdiction; they
shew, that the right of appeal should be kept within its proper range; that
the Court of last resort should be permitted to exercise no original juris-
diction whatever: and that any material departure from these principles,
which have every where, and at all times, been regarded as fundamental:
would sink the Courts of original jurisdiction into the condition of mere
preparatory tribunals, or ministerial agents of the Court of Appeals, thereby
depriving the litigants of the important benefit of a first, full and open dis-
cussion, with a succeeding careful and critical revision of their controversy
as contemplated by the Constitution, and finally turn awry and subvert the
whole judicial department of our government.

But although this comparative view of the requisite amount of the skill
and labor of the Judges, of the original and appellate tribunals, may suffi-
ciently account for the difference, which has always been made, in the sala-
ries of the Judges of those Courts; yet, considering the Court of Chancery
as one of original jurisdiction, it will be necessary to advert to other cir-
cumstances to account for the difference between the salaries of the Chan-
cellor and of the Judges of the common law Courts of first resort; and
even between the salaries of the Judges of whole districts of such Courts,
and that of the Chancellor.

Our code of laws is, in many respects, very peculiar in its principles; but,
its great and principal peculiarity arises from the judicial machinery by
which it is administered.

That part, called the common law, as contradistinguished from equity, is
administered by Courts composed of a Judge and a jury. It is presumed,
that the Judge knows the law, but, that the jury do not', and, therefore, it
is the province of the Judge to expound and declare the law to the jury,
who are called upon to say, by their unanimous verdict, whether, by apply-
ing the law, as thus declared, the plaintiff should obtain what he neks or
not. But a jury, being composed of twelve men, not lawyers, gathered
from the people for the occasion, the whole matter in controversy must be
reduced to a single point, or so presented as to place it in their power to put
their unanimous verdict into the form of a general affirmative or negative
response. A learned and experienced Judge might find no great difficulty
in so framing his judgment as to grant relief, in every way, suited to the
most complicated case, that could be presented to him; hut twelve men,
unlearned in the law, would, in the same case, find it exceedingly perplex-
ing, or altogether impracticable, unanimously, to agree upon any adequate
complex form of granting relief; and, therefore, a jury cannot, with pro-
priety, he called upon, in any caae, even although it should involve a compli-
cated title to property, for more than a general affirmative or negative ver-
dict; or for a special verdict, finding the truth of the facts, leaving the con-
clusion of law to be pronounced by the Judge.—(3 Jeff, Corr. Lett. 2.)

Hence it is that all judicial proceedings, according to the course of the
common law, have a perpetual tendency to rigid exactness and precision; so
as to be easily explained to, and applied by a jury; or, at least, eo as to