THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 631

This interference with the duration of judicial salaries has
another obvious and direct tendency, no less hostile to the prin-
ciples of our Constitution. The appointing power is lodged, ex-
clusively, with the Governor and Council. But, if the General
Assembly can, at pleasure, withhold or reduce a judicial salary, it
is evident they may, in that manner, come into direct collision
with the appointing power of the Executive. If the person, ap-
pointed to a judicial office, happens to be displeasing to the Legisla-
ture, his salary may be, at once, withdrawn or reduced so as to
force him to resign. And what is most odious, in this kind of
collision, is, that this unjustly excited and misguided feeling of the
legislative body may be aroused by persons who are not members
of it; by persons who are not of either house; but, who have in-
fluence and a knack at intrigue. Such malcontents may wyork
upon the honest indolence of members, and urge them on, un-
thinkingly, to effect the ruin of the best of men, and the most sacred
of institutions, merely to gratify some smuggled and vile malig-
nancy, which they dare not have the impudence to exhibit openly
before the public.

The Executive alone are responsible for the appointments they
make; and the Legislature have no right, and ought not to inter-
fere in any way whatever. They have no right to look beyond the
official behavior of those in office. It is their constitutional right
to inquire whether a public officer behaves himself well or not;
and, if he does not, to proceed against him. Let legislators now
put the question to their constituents, to any competent and
credible witnesses. Has the Chancellor, have the Judges dis-
charged their several duties as they ought, as was required of
them by the law and the Constitution; have they behaved them-
selves well ? If they have not, it is the solemn and sacred duty of
legislators, from which, according to the principles of the Consti-
tution, they ought not to shrink, to call the alleged delinquent
before them to answer for his conduct; and. on finding the charges
against him sustained, to remove him from office. But, beyond
this, the General Assembly have no right to go. In all other re-
spects, the Chancellor and Judges are independent of legislators,
and legislators of them.

From what has been said it appears, First, That the House of
Delegates, of the last session, assumed the power to reduce the
* Chancellor's salary at pleasure, which was opposed by the 675
Senate, as iar as it was in their power; on the ground, that
it could not be, in any manner, constitutionally diminished during
the continuance of his commission.

Second, That the provision, requiring the salaries of the Chan-
cellor and Judges to be secured to them during the continuance of
their commissions, was suggested to the American people by the
great national controversy, which terminated in their indepen-