620 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

any legislators would invoke, and place upon their * tables,
662 the clearest evidences of the Chancellor's constitutional in-
dependency, for the express purpose of prostrating it; and of
making him the mere supple creature of either branch of the
Assembly; and that too, not by a bold and open movement, which
struck down his rights at a single blow; but, by the low and crawl-
ing contrivance of a temporary Act; which, while it offered an
ostensible extension of bounty, covertly and in reality bought out
the Chancellor's independency, the chief stay, the pride, and the
only blessing of his high and laborious station. No such designs
can, or ought to be imputed to the legislators of 1798.

On the contrary, those legislators could have had no other inten-
tion, in thus announcing their Act as "A supplement" to that of
1792, than to assert, by the very first word they recorded upon the
statute book, that they followed the example, and legislated under
the same impressions, and according to the same principles, that
their predecessors had done. They meant to say, that they adopted
the principles of the Act of 1792; that as that Act conformed to
the Declaration of Rights, in giving to the Chancellor a salary
during the continuance of his commission; so this, their Act,
should give him a salary for a similar duration. That as the Act
of 1792 had made only a temporary provision for the payment of
the amount then given; so this, their Act, should, in like manner,
temporarily provide for the payment of that they gave. The Act
of 1792 gave the less, this the greater amount; the Act of 1792 set
apart a particular fund for payment; this Act, in general terms,
directs, that the amount given shall be "paid by the Treasurer of
the Western Shore." These are the points of similarity and of
difference between these two Acts. The latter is, then, in sense
and substance, honestly and fairly "A supplement," to the former.
It follows, therefore, that the present Chancellor is now, and will
be entitled, during the continuance of his commission, to demand
and receive, annually, by virtue of this Act of 1798, and of the
thirtieth Article of the Declaration of Rights, the sum of twelve
hundred and seventy-five pounds current money.

These three distinct ideas of the amount, the duration, and the
provision for payment of judicial salaries have been continually,
under all circumstances, and on every change, carefully borne in
mind by the representatives of the people of Maryland. After the
alteration of the judicial system of this State, made by the Act of

1804. ch. 55, was confirmed, the Legislature passed the Act of

1805. ch. 86, entitled "An Act to establish permanent salaries for
* the Judges of the six judicial districts of this State." The
663 preamble of which recites, that "whereas by the thirtieth
section of the Declaration of Rights it is declared, that salaries
liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the Judges during
the continuance of their commissions." Hence, it appears, that