612 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

tional salary, given by the Act of 1797, ch. 71, was given to the
Chancellor, "as Chancellor and Judge of the land office;" and
* apprehending, that although it was, in some respects,
653 temporary in its terms; and although it had never been con-
tinued by any legislative Act; yet, that it would be virtually con-
tinued by operation of the Constitution; they, therefore, deemed
it necessary, expressly and by name, to except this Act out of the
operation of their general continuing law; or, in other words, to
discontinue it; and, as they believed, to make such a declaration
respecting it as would be equivalent to an absolute repeal. If such
was their understanding of the Act of 1797, when taken in con-
nection with the Constitution—and it is difficult to perceive how
they can be otherwise understood—the last House of Delegates
were certainly correct in considering both of these Acts; as well
that of 1797, as the one of 1798; as well that which had not, as
that which had been continued, as standing in the way of the
execution of their resolution to reduce the Chancellor's salary.
But the Act of 1798, ch. 86, virtually and effectually, repeals all
antecedent Acts which had been passed for ascertaining and fixing
the amount of the Chancellor's salary; and is, itself, firmly and
immovably sustained by the Declaration of Rights; and needs no
continuing, or other Act, for the mere purpose of designating what
shall be the amount of the Chancellor's salary.

So much then, as to all those Acts, which speak of, or in any
manner have heretofore, compensated the Chancellor in his char-
acter of Judge of the land office. The whole of them might have
been passed over in silence, if the delegates of the last session
had not invoked them into this controversy. But, it is believed,
that, in whatever manner they may be considered, nothing can be
deduced from them, which can, in any way, impair the right
which the present Chancellor has to the salary designated by the
Act of 1798. Let us now proceed to the consideration of those
Acts of Assembly under which the Chancellor has been heretofore,
and until the 26th day of February last, compensated for his ser-
vices as Chancellor.

Whatever inference may be deduced from the language of the
first section of the Act of 1798; and, however conclusive it may
seem to be, that any salary given to the Chancellor, as Chancellor,
must be, and is secured to him, by virtue of the Declaration of
Rights, during the continuance of his commission; yet it may be
said, that in this instance, and from this Act of 1798, no such in-
ference can be deduced; no such intention can be ascribed to the
Legislature who passed it. Because, by the second section
654 * it is expressly declared, that " this Act is to continue and
be in force till the twentieth day of October, eighteen hundred,
and until the end of the next Session of Assembly which shall
happen thereafter." In consequence of which limitation, it was,