THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 583

*our special attention. It is declared, "that salaries liberal
but not profuse ought to be secured to the Chancellor and 622
the Judges." The authors of this Article were perfectly well
acquainted with the condition of this country under the colonial
monarchy. The Declaration of Independence had proclaimed, that
"he (the British king,) has erected a multitude of new offices, and
sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out

The Judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to
the caprice of that power. The regular payment of his salary should not
depend upon the good will, or even upon the good economy of that power.—
(Smith's Wea, Nat. b. 5, c. 1, pt. 2.)

It seems to be a generally received opinion, that the Chancellor and Judges
have, each of them, an estate, or a rested interest in their respective salaries,
(Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236; Coop. Just. 599.) This estate in a judi-
cial salary is, however, one of a very peculiar character; it is not subject,
before it becomes due, to be disposed of at the pleasure of the holder. It is
like a limited and qualified estate in an annuity. As where an annuity
charged upon, land was granted by Oliver to Emsonne, in consideration of
his, Emsonne's, giving his counsel to Oliver; it was held, that the trust and
confidence which Oliver reposed in Emsonne for his advice, being incidental
to the cause for which the annuity was granted it could not be assigned to
another or forfeited. (Oliver v. Emsonne. Dyer, 1 b.; 1 H. Sloe. 627, note;
Maund's Case, 7 Co. 112: Co. Lift. 144 b, note 1.) So that looking to the
peculiar cause of the grant it appears, that even in the case of an annuity
granted by one person to another, the grantee may have vested in him noth-
ing more than an inalienable and qualified estate.

But in deciding upon the nature of a public grant, the great object of
public policy in making the grant must be attended to. The general intent
pervades the whole: and each yearly payment of the salary must be subject
to it. The public has a deep interest in the due and appropriate application
of judicial salaries as well as in their regular continuance and payment;
because they are given for services rendered to the State of the most pre-
cious nature, by a class of the most important " trustees of the public.'' Such
salaries are granted to support the dignity of the State, and the administra-
tion of justice; and therefore no judicial salary can be sold, assigned, mort-
gaged, or transferred, either by the act of the party, or by operation of laws
as in cases of insolvency; because the public policy by which any such vol-
untary or involuntary alienation is prohibited is incidental to the cause for
which it is granted; and cannot be separated from it. One of the special
objects in giving such a salary is to enable the Judge continually, and at all
times to discharge his duties to the public without interruption from any
pecuniary embarrassment; for, although mere insolvency cannot be con-
sidered, in all cases even as a deviation from duty, much less a crime; yet
if a Judge, because of his insolvency, be restrained from performing the
labors assigned to him, such a failure of duty may be deemed a misbeha-
vior in office within the meaning of the Constitution. (Griesly's Case, 8
Co. 82; Crouch v. Martin, 2 Vern. 595; Mithwold v. Waldbank, 2 Ves. 238;
Flarty v. Odium, 3 T. R. 681; Ledderdale v. Montrose, 4 T. E. 248; Barwick v.
Reade, 1 H. Blac. 627; Arbuckle v. Cowtan, 3 Bos. & Pul. 322; Stone v. Led-
derdale, 2 Antr. 533; Monys v. Leake, 8 T. R. 411; Ex parte Parnell, 1 Swan.
436; Pow. Mort. 80, note C; 1814, ch. 113, s. 4; Act Cong. 18th March, 1818,

ch. 18, s. 4; Lowe v. Moore, 1 McCord, 343.)