578 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

Not quite two years after the meeting of the second Colonial
Congress, the United States declared themselves independent;
and, in their Declaration of Independence, among the wrongs they
charge upon the British king, and as one of "the causes which
impelled them to the separation," it is alleged, that "he has made
Judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries."

After all these ample discussions and close investigations of the
rights of the people, and after the publication of all these solemn
acts, the Convention of Maryland was convened, in the month of
August, 1776, to establish a form of government for the State.
The great field of politics had been fearlessly and diligently
617 * explored in every direction; and the soundest and most
approved political axioms were laid before that Convention. It
appears, that none of those principles and solemn acts, in which
their fellow-citizens had taken a deep interest, were overlooked, or
suffered to escape their attention—of which the following com-
Governments on the Government of the mother country, is, the manner of
providing for the support of Government, and for all the executive officers
of the Crown. The freedom and right efficiency of the Constitution require,
that the executive and judicial officers of Government should be indepen-
dent of the legislative: and more especially in popular Governments, where
the Legislature itself is so much influenced by the humors and passions of
the people: for if they do not, there will be neither justice nor equity in any
of the Courts of law, nor any efficient execution of the laws and orders of
Government in the magistracy; according, therefore, to the Constitution of
Great Britain, the crown has the appointment and payment of the several
executive and judicial officers, and the Legislature settles a permanent and
fixed appointment for the support of Government and the civil list in gene-
ral. The crown therefore has, a fortiori, a, right to require of the colonies,
to whom, by its commission or charter, it gives the power of Government,
such permanent support appropriated to the offices, not the officers of Gov-
ernment, that they may not depend upon the temporary and arbitrary will
of the Legislature."

And again he says, 'the point then of this very important question comes
to this issue, whether the inconveniences arising, and experienced by some
instances of misapplications of appropriations, are a sufficient reason and
ground for establishing a measure so directly contrary to the British Con-
stitution: and whether the inconveniences to be traced in the history of the
colonies, through the votes and journals of their Legislatures, in which the
support of Governors, Judges, and officers of the crown will be found to
have been withheld or reduced on occasions, where the assemblies have sup-
posed that they have had reason to disapprove the nomination,—or the per-
son, or his conduct;—whether, I say, these inconveniences have not been
more detrimental, and injurious to Government; and whether, instead of
these colonies being dependent on, and governed under, the officers of the
crown, the sceptre is not reversed, and the officers of the crown dependent
on and governed by the Assemblies, as the colonists themselves allow, that
this measure renders the Governor and all other servants of the crown de-
pendent on the Assembly."—(Pown. Adm. Colo. 76, 78: Smith's His. N.
York, 118; 1 Pitk. His. 126; 7 Moss. His. Soci. 129.)