558 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

The General Assembly are constitutionally bound to give a salary to a Chan-
cellor or Judge, which shall be secured to him during the continuance
of his commission; but they may. by temporary appropriations, or in
any other form, provide for the payment of such a salary.

This was a controversy which originated between the House of
Delegates and the Senate, at the December Session, 1824, of the
General Assembly of Maryland, respecting the salary of the Chan-
cellor. No charge or imputation, of any kind whatever, was made,
by either House, against the Chancellor; nor does it appear, that
any complaint had been made, to either house, against him, by
any one; except that contained in a petition presented by Hugh
Thompson to the Senate without any previous application to the
Chancellor, praying to be permitted to appeal from an order which
had been passed by the Chancellor on the 12th of February, 1825,
in the case of McKim v. Thompson. Although the Chancellor was
not, in any way, directly made a party to this controversy between
the then two Houses of the General Assembly; or notified by either
House of its existence; yet as his iuteiests were deeply involved,
he was thereby virtually made a party; and therefore, at the next
Session of the General Assembly, he claimed the right to appear,
to defend his interests and to maintain his constitutional inde-
pencleucy. Accordingly he presented the following memorial, find
on the third day after the commencement of the session furnished
each member with a printed copy thereof.

By a note to the case of McKim v. Thompson, (ante, 171,) the
reader has been referred to this case. The mere principles of law
involved in that ca.se can have no bearing upon this. In those
respects the two cases can have no sort of connexion with each
other. But on an attentive consideration of the various move-
ments in the December Session of 1824, of the General Assembly,
as carefully stated in the following memorial, it cannot fail to be
perceived, that, for some time previous to the passing of the order
of the 12th of February, 1825, in the case of McKim v. Thompson,
*and at that time, an exceedingly angry excitement pre-
596 vailed against the Chancellor, who had been appointed no
longer than the month of August previous. When or how that
excitement originated, or of its authors, or causes, there can be no
occasion here to take any notice whatever. For, in the considera-
tion of great constitutional principles, it is proper, that we should,
as far as practicable, put aside all personal animosities, jealousies,
and griefs, and confine ourselves to the examination of the manner
in which the ease illustrates the bearing of those great principles.
It is therefore only of importance, that it should be here recollected,
as a matter of history, that such an excitement did then prevail,
and was then in active operation, when Thompson, by his petition,
complained to the Senate, that the Chancellor's order of the 12th