542 DUVALL v. WATERS.—1 BLAND.

It appears, that the English Court of Chancery had steadily con-
fined itself in granting relief against waste, to those cases only
where there was some subsisting privity of title or contract between
the parties, until about the year 1785; since which time it has gone
one step further, and granted injunctions against strangers to stay
trespass, in strong cases of destruction or irreparable mischief;
or where the irreparable mischief might be completely effected
before any trial could be had as to the controverted right. But,
at that point, it seems to have come to a stand; not, however,
without expressing a regret, that its jurisdiction had not been ex-
tended so far as to protect real estate from waste and injury pending
a controversy about the title. I have seen no reason to doubt, that
the powers of this Court in granting injunctions have been always
considered as in all respects co-extensive with those of the Chan-
cery Court of England. Pillsworth v. Hopton, 6 Ves. 51; Mitchell
v. Dors, 6 Ves. 147; Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 305; Smith v.
Collyer. 8 Ves. 89; Courthope v. Mapplesden, 10 Ves. 290; Crockford
v. Alexander, 15 Fes. 138; Norway v. Rowe, 19 Ves. 147; Jones v.
Jones, 3 Merir. 173.

It appears to be even yet the fixed rule of the Court of Chancery
of England, that the granting of an injunction to stay waste must
depend, either upon the fact of there being a privity of title or
contract acknowledged by the answer; or an unquestionable legal
or equitable title in the plaintiff; as where a purchaser files a bill
for specific performance of his contract, suggesting, that the de-
fendant was proceeding to cut timber. &c., an injunction may be
* granted if the contract be stated and admitted. For if
578 the bill states and admits, that the defendant asserts and
relies upon what he alleges to be a valid adverse title in himself,
the plaintiff thereby states himself out of Court, or if the defend-
ant in his answer positively denies the plaintiff's title, the injunc-
tion will be refused; or having been granted will, on the coming in of
such an answer, be dissolved. Pillsworth v. Hopton. 6 Ves. 51;
Smith v. Collyer, 8 Ves. 89; Norway v. Rowe, 19 Yen. 147.

It is said, however, in one of the most respectable treatises on
pleadings in Chancery, that, " pending an ejectment in a Court of
common law, a Court of equity will restrain the tenant in posses-
sion from committing waste, by felling timber, ploughing ancient
meadow, or otherwise. Against this inconvenience a remedy at
the common law was in many cases provided during the pendency
of a real action, by the writ of extrepement; and when the proceed-
ing by ejectment became the usual mode of trying a title to land, as
the writ of estrepement did not apply to the case, the Courts of
equity, proceeding on the same principles, supplied the defect."
Mitf. Plea. 136. But the only authorities cited in support of what
is here said are cases between landlord and tenant, where the title
of the plaintiff had not been, and could not be denied by the de-