DUVALL v. WATERS.—1 BLAND. 539

* The writ of estrepement is certain!y a preventive remedy,
and so far it is analogous to a writ of prohibition, by which a 574
tenant in dower, or by the courtesy might be prevented from doing
waste. But it is more; it is also a remedial and corrective remedy, be-
cause, the holder of land may not only be prevented from doing
waste; but if he should do any notwithstanding the prohibition, the
plaintiff may recover damages for such waste, even up to the time
when possession shall be delivered to him. This writ has some
other peculiar traits of character. It can never be brought into
action independently and alone; it must always be associated with
another as its leader; to which it acts as an auxiliary, whose for-
tunes it must follow, and to whose final fate it must submit. If it
emanates, as it may, at the same time and together with its
chief, from the Chancery office, it is then called an original; but if
it be awarded by the Court, in which the action is depending, as
it may, it is then called a judicial writ of estrepement. This writ,
as its very name distinctly imports, is always intended to stay
waste. It is no where spoken of as a means by which a mere tres-
pass may be prevented; in all its modifications, it is continually
treated as a remedy against waste. F. N. B, 139; 2 Inst. 328; 3
Blac. Com. 225; Jacob. L. Die. verb Estrepement. But in a writ of
right, and in all the other actions, except a writ of waste, to which an
estrepement is called in as an auxiliary, there is not any privity of
title whatever between the parties to the suit; all such privity being
expressly disavowed. The plaintiff' asserts, and calls for the vin-
dication of his absolute title against an unqualified wrong-doer,
who he complains of as a disseisor, ejector, or trespasser. And,
therefore, in all such cases, the injury which it is the office of the
writ of estrepement to prevent, is not properly waste, found on
privity of title, as between a reversioner and a particular tenant;
but literally a trespass, in the Chancery acceptation of that term;
and not a mere abusive use of that which a lawful holder had a
right to enjoy.

Where the title and the rights of the parties are admitted, there
can be no mistake; and therefore, there should be no confusion or
misapplication of these terms waste and trespass. But, in the
English authorities, there is not the same distinctness, in the ap-
plication of them, to any such injuries to the inheritance, where
the rights of the parties are disputed and put in litigation. If the
party asserts his title to an estate, by an action at law, such acts,
with * reference to a presumption in favor of the validity of
his title pending the suit, are said to be waste; but if he 575
asks in a Court of Chancery, to have the doing of such acts pre-
vented by an injunction, they are denominated trespasses. Eden
Inj. 136; Mitchett v. Dors, 6 Fes. 147; Crockford v. Alexander, 15
Ves. 138; Mogg v. Mogg, Dick. 670. This difference in character-
izing the same injurious acts, when proposed to be prohibited by