BILLINGSLEA v. GILBERT.—1 BLAND. 533

BLAND, C., 27th April, 1829.—The matter of the petition of
Elizabeth Billingslea standing ready for hearing, and the solicitors
of the parties having been fully heard, the proceedings were read
and considered.

There can be no doubt, that the answer of a defendant may be
received by consent without oath. It is every day's practice to do
so: but the consent of the plaintiff must be expressly given in
* writing by himself or his solicitor; or it must be shewn as 568
as a necessary inference from some act of his which clearly implies,
that he knew a paper purporting to be an answer, not sworn to,
had been filed. As in this case, if .the plaintiff had appeared on
the notice of motion to dissolve the injunction and opposed it,
without objecting to the answer on account of its not having been
sworn to, he would have been precluded from making such an ob-
jection at any time thereafter; because of the manifest waiver of
his right to have an answer on oath. But this defendant did not
appear in opposition to the motion to dissolve the injunction; and
it has not been shewn that he ever, either expressly or irnpliedly,
consented to receive the defendant's answer to his bill without its
being verified by an oath.

At the time when the notice of the motion to dissolve the injunc-
tion was entered on the docket, and, from that time until it was
made absolute, it appears, that the plaintiff was in a state of
health, which rendered it at least doubtful, whether he could have
bound himself by any consent in relation to this suit; or have at-
tended to it with that judgment and discretion which men usually
pay, and ought to be permitted to bestow iipon their own affairs.
Kemp v. Squire, I Ves. 206. Therefore upon consideration of all
the circumstances, 1 am of opinion, that the dissolution of the
injunction was irregularly and improperly obtained. The suit
having abated after that time by the death of the plaintiff, the
docket entry, that it was dismissed by order of the complainant's
solicitor, is manifestly erroneous; because there was then, in fact,
no such suit depending which could have been so dismissed. But,
even if there had been a suit depending, a general dismissal, with-
out saying any thing of the injunction, would not have amounted
to a dissolution of it; nor would the death of either party, by which
the suit became abated, operate as a dissolution of the injunction.
Griffith v. Bronaugh, ante, 547.

Whereupon it is ordered, that the injunction heretofore granted
be and the same is hereby revived and re-established in full force
until further order. And the defendant, the petitioner, or the
legal representatives of the late plaintiff upon whom his interest
in the suit has devolved, are hereby permitted, without prejudice
from this order or any proceedings heretofore had in this
suit, either to revive the *same, or to have the injunction 569