RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 5

out of the allegations of the parties, in which no part of the evi-
dence, which might have been offered in support of them, could
appear; although, as to such evidence, and in their direction to
the jury, the Court might have fallen into many and great errors.
Hence it was, that the parties were, by statute, allowed to have
any such matter inserted in the record, in the form of a bill of ex-
ceptions, so as to have the decision, in relation to it. revised and
corrected, if erroneous, in a Court of error. Tidd Pra. 787; 1
Hal. Const. H. Eng. 9, note. But, whether the errors complained
of were in fact, or in law; or whether they arose in an interlocu-
tory proceeding, or in the last act of the Court, the party was not
allowed to intercept the case in its progress, or to exercise his
right of appeal, until the Court of original jurisdiction had pro-
nounced its final judgment; as in partition or account there could
be no writ * of error allowed, but upon the final judgment;
2 Sac. Abr. 454: Samuel v. Juden, 6 East, 333; nor could 9
any writ of error be brought to reverse even what might be called
a final judgment upon any matter which rested in the mere discre-
tion of the Court, Darts v. The State, 3 H. & J. 154; Gorer v.
Cooley, 1 H. & G. 7; Liter v. Green, 2 Wheat. 306; Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Peters, 445; Boyle v. ZacJiariah, 6 Peters, 648; as for
its refusal to continue a case; Wood v. Young, 4 Cran. 237; or to
grant a new trial; Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cran. 11; Marine In. Co.
v. Young, 5 Cran. 187; or to reinstate a case after a non-suit or
dismissal; United States v. Erans, 5 Cran. 280; Welch v. Mande-
ville, 7 Cran. 152; or to allow a plea to be amended, or anew one to
be filed; Marine In. Co. v. Hodgxon, 6 Cran. 206, or the allowance
of a commission between the discretionary limits of five and ten
per cent, as prescribed by the Acts of Assembly. 1798, ch. 101,
sub-ch. 10, sec. 2; Nicholls v. Hodges, 1 Peters, 562; 1826, ch. 27, s.
5. And as a party cannot, with reason, complain of the error of
a judgment which he had, by his negligence, suffered to go against
himself, or which he had expressly consented should be passed, he
is not allowed to have a writ of error upon a judgment by default
against him; Hawkins v. Jackson, 6 H. & J. 151. note; nor where
the proceeding or judgment was had by consent, or it had been
agreed, that no writ of error should be brought. Dormer's Case,
5 Co. 40; Clare v. Lynch, T. Raym. 372; Wright v. Nwtt, 1 T. E.
388; Camden v. Edie, 1 H. Blac. 21. These general limitations as
to the range of the right of appeal, it is evident, are all of them
well calculated to keep its exercise in order, and so far to prevent
it from being abused.

But it having been found, that this absolute right of appeal,
even in cases in which it was clearly allowable, had been often
abused, by being perverted to the mere purposes of delay, and by
being made the means of putting the plaintiff's claim again at
hazard, after it had been at great trouble and expense sufficiently