492 IGLEHART v. ARMIGER.—1 BLAND.

privileged creditors, such as nautical salvors, material men, &c.;
nor is it altogether like a common mortgage, although it operates
and is treated, in many respects, as a mortgage. It differs from
all these in this, that, if it exists at all, it must originate with,
and as an incident of the contract of purchase itself; that it is not
always a part, or principle of the contract as in the case of a lien
given by the civil law, to privileged creditors; that it is not
founded on any express stipulation; that it is not dependent on
having possession; that it is not deduced from any statute; and
that it does not rest on any general principles of common law.

This doctrine in relation to equitable liens, it is said, has been
* probably derived from the civil law as to goods, Mackreth
523 Symmons, 15 Yen, 344; Walker v. Preswick, 2 Fes. 622,
and it seems, that such a lien upon goods is a personal right which
cannot be transferred to another, Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R.
606. But in whatever way it may have originated, it is now well
settled, that an equitable lieu arises from the principle of equity,
that the purchaser of real estate ought not to be allowed to hold
it, as his own. until the vendor has been fully satisfied; and that
it is a vendor's security and privilege. It is indispensably neces-
sary to the existence of such a lien, that the parties should stand
in the relation toward each other of vendor and vendee of real
estate, the purchase money of which has not been fully paid. If
that relationship is, in any mariner whatever, put off, altered, or
relinquished, an equitable lieu either cannot arise, or will be de-
stroyed. The pure relationship of creditor and debtor, or of bor-
rower and lender, is incompatible with the existence of an equita-
ble lien, excludes, or extinguishes it. In a contract of loan, the
relation of creditor and debtor attaches independently of any
securities for the payment of the money, such as a mortgage, bond,
or note: which, when given, are the mere accidental circumstances
of a contract in all respects complete without them. The chose in
action is assignable in its nature, in equity at least, independently
of those eA'idences and securities of it. But in a purchase of real
estate payment is an essential part of the contract; hence it is an
established principle of equity, that the vendor holds a lien upon
the estate to secure the payment of the purchase money; and this
lien is an incident uniformly arising from, and associated with such
a contract. Ex parte Gwynne, 12 Ves. 379. It exists in all cases,
unless a manifest intention, that it should not exist, appears;
Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 341; and it continues until it has
been, in some way, impliedly or positively waived; all which it
lays upon the vendee to shew. Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 330;
Sug. Vend. & Pur. 386; Pow. Mort. 1062,

In the case of a purchase of real estate the equitable lien
arises an incident thereto, and can only exist together with it, as
principal and incident. In the case of loan the debt is the prin-