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PHILLIPS v. SH1PLEY.—1 BLAND. 487
that statute relate. Lucas v. Wilson, 2 Burr. 701; Lansdale v.
Littledale, 2 Ves. Jun. 453. Whence it is evident, that an award
made on references in a suit in equity has not been regulated by
any legislative enactment whatever; yet it has at all times been
held by the Courts of common law and equity in England, to be
within the regular scope of their powers to pass an order, with
the consent of the parties to any suit then depending, referring
the matter in controversy to arbitration; and to enforce the award,
Lucas Y. Wilson, 2 Burr. 701; Dick v. Milligan, 2 Ves. Jun. 24; 2
Fow. Exch. Pra. 350.
The reference of cases depending in this Court to arbitration,
and the passing of decrees upon awards was common before the
Revolution. Waring v. Mullan, 1771, Chan. Pro. lib. W. K., No.
1, fol. 6, 28, 48, &c., and has continued to be the practice ever
since. Whether there has been any well established and regular
course of proceeding, in relation to such references, does not dis-
tinctly appear; but, it seems, that if the award be in any respect
exceptionable, it may, on motion, and on the fact being sufficiently
shewn, be set aside. Nevan v. Pinkney, 1787, Chan. Pro. lib. S.
H. H., Utter B, fol. 6. It is presumed, that this Court would set
aside an award returned to it, upon any ground allowed to be
taken against an award in a Court of common law; or upon any
other ground, on which a bill might be filed between the same
parties to have an award vacated. Goldsmith v. Tilly, 1 H. & J.
361; Harris v. Dorsey, 1 H. & J. 416; Cromwell v. Owings, 6 H. &
J. 10; Hewitt v. The State, 6 H. & J. 95. But if no objection be
made against an award, then, according to a long standing rule
and practice, either party may apply for and have a decree passed
in conformity to its terms. Bnncner v. Gordon, 17th March, 1789,
Chan. Pro. Ub. S. H., let. B, fol. 597; Hardy v. Howard, MS. 16th
July, 1794.
Upon the general principles by which this Court is governed,
and by analogy to the express provisions of the Acts of Assembly
regulating similar references in actions at common law, a party
cannot be permitted to withdraw from or to revoke a reference
made by an order of this Court, with the consent of parties, with-
out the sanction and order of this Court itself allowing it to be
done. Crawshay v. Collins, 1 Swan. 41; Harcourt v. Ramsbottom,
1 Jac, & Walk. 491. * In this case there has been no such
regular and solemn revocation. The award returned ap- 518
pearing to be sufficiently fair and unambiguous upon its face to
afford a proper foundation for a decree; Tillard v. Fisher, 3 H. &
McH. 118; and the affidavits read in evidence being entirely too
loose and contradictory to sustain the allegation of malpractice in
the arbitrators; the caveat must therefore be overruled and the
award confirmed.
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