HODGES v. MULLIKIN.—1 BLAND. 479

the decree does not charge two or more defendants and is entire
in its nature, it is not the course of the Court to open or modify it
further than is indispensably necessary to correct the error com-
plained of. Lingan v. Hcwderson, ante, 235; Ranelagh v. Thornhill,
2 Chan. Ca. 153.

Applying these principles to this case, it is clear, that this decree
need not, and therefore will not be opened in any manner for the
* benefit of the defendant Harwood; because he does not
ask it; and because his liability, as set forth and admitted 508
by himself in his answer, may well be separated from any charge
against the other defendant Mullikin; therefore the judgment of
the Court, so far as it has bound his interests in favor of those
creditors whose claims he has not paid, must be allowed to stand
and have its full force; and will only be so modified as to let in
other existing incumbrances upon the property conveyed in addi-
tion to that of the mortgage. Hence it is perfectly manifest, that
Harwood is a witness whose interest cannot be at all affected if
the decree remains altogether as it now stands; and if it should
be opened for the benefit of the trustee, and cestuis que trust under
the deed of the 7th April, 1810, and no further than to let in their
incumbrance in addition to that of the mortgage; then, as Har-
wood, has been introduced to have it opened for that purpose, he
is a witness testifying against his own interest; so that, in either
view of the subject, he is a competent witness upon the present
occasion.

The competency of the witness Nicholas Brewer has also been
objected to on the ground of his having an interest which must be
affected by the decision now called for. The principles which
have been just applied to the case of the witness Harwood have in
some respects a bearing upon the situation of this witness. He is
the solicitor of the plaintiff, and the trustee appointed by the
decree to make the sale. The judgment of the Court, so far as
regards his client and the defendant Harwood, must be allowed to
stand; and therefore he has earned some compensation as the
solicitor of the plaintiff. He has not even yet, however, qualified
himself, by giving bond, to act as trustee under the decree; but,
in consideration of his forbearing to execute his trust, and of an
extension of credit agreed to between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant Harwood, he, Harwood, paid to Brewer $200, as it is said,
in part of his commissions; and it is Brewer's liability to refund
this sum, in case the decree should not be executed as it stands,
that makes him, as is alleged, a witness interested to maintain the
decree in favor of the plaintiff by whom he is produced. For-
bearance to sue is a consideration sufficient in law to give validity
to a promise.. Selw. N. P. 56. And according to the rules and
practice of the Court, a trustee is only allowed full commission
upon the amount of an actual sale; and if the.parties prevent him