MOEETON v. HARRISON.—1 BLAND. 471

sale of real estate, where the purchase money is not paid; and, is
considered as parcel of the contract itself, unless it be shewn to
have been tacitly or expressly abandoned. Sug. Vend. & Pur. ch.
12; Pow. Mort. 1062; Brown v. Oilman, 4 Wheat. 256; Bayley v.
Greenleaf, 1 Wheat. 46; Tompkins v. Hitchell, 2 Rand. 428.

The case presented by this bill is one arising on a contract of
bargain and sale of real estate with an incident lien for the
* payment of the purchase money. It is this, or there is
nothing in the bill to give the Court jurisdiction; for, if it 499
were a mere loan, in which the relation of debtor and creditor was
created, to which was added the security of a bond, to insure the
payment of the debt due, the plaintiffs would have a complete
remedy at law, and this Court could not take cognizance of the
case; nor would the prayer in the bill for an account give the Court
jurisdiction, since the case is not, in itself, a proper one for an
account,—there being no mutual dealings which give rise to a
series of charges on one side as opposed to a variety of payments
on the other. Dinwiddie v. Bailey, 6 Ves. 141: Smith v. Marks, 2
Rand. 449. This is a single stipulation and charge; and the
object ivS to enforce the equitable lieu as being a part of the con-
tract of sale.

This equitable lien is to be found classed, in all the books, with
mortgages; it is however not precisely the same, in all respects, as
an ordinary mortgage, given as a security for a loan of money:
but it is a specific lien, in most respects so strongly analogous to
the specific lien of a common mortgage, that they have been
almost altogether regulated by the same principles of equity. But
these securities,—neither the incident, nor the express lien as by
mortgage,—should not be confounded with mere personal securi-
ties, or obligations for the payment of money of any class or grade
whatever. A bond, promissory note, or simple contract for the
payment of money, in any shape or form, is a personal contract
which surely cannot, either at law or in equity, be assimilated to,
or governed by the principles applicable to a mortgage of any
description.

These plaintiffs do not ask to have their specialty or simple con-
tract enforced as a means of obtaining payment from their debtor.
They do not plant themselves on the mere relation of creditors
against this defendant as their debtor. They are here as vendors
against the defendant as their vendee; and they claim the benefit
of the lien which they hold as an incident of that relationship.
As mortgagees they sue this defendant as the mortgagor of cer-
tain property, which they ask to have sold to satisfy the balance
due upon that mortgage. This is the light in which this contro-
versy must be considered; consequently, the Statute of Limita-
tions in relation to bonds and simple contracts for the payment of
money can have no sort of application to this case.