466 MOEETON v. HARR1SON.—1 BLAND.

have been sufficiently avoided. There is, in this case, no answer
denying the subsequent admissions and promises charged to have
been made; consequently, they must be taken for true, and are
an ample avoidance of the pleas; which, therefore, can be of no
avail whatever.

In the case of Morgan v. Roberts the defendant put in three
pleas. No objection was made on the ground, that a defendant
could not in equity, as well as at common law under the statute,
be allowed to plead two or more pleas in his defence; and I sus-
tained two of them, and overruled the third. Since then my
attention has been particularly called to this point. This matter
in England seems to be not yet finally settled. Whitbread v.
Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C. C. 417; 2 Ves. & Bea. 153, note; Gibson \.
Whitehead, 4 Mad. 241; VanHook v. Whitlock, 3 Paige,419; Beam.
PL Eq. 14; Mitf. PI 296; Wyat's Pro,. Beg. 280.
At common law, in almost all criminal cases, the accused is
494 allowed to plead, at the same time, two or more pleas in bar;
2 Hawk. c. 23, s. 128, 137; 2 Hale PL Cro. 239, 248; The King v.
Gibsow, 8 East, 107; The Commonwealth v. Myers, 1 Firry. G'a. 188;
and, in all civil cases, the defendant is allowed, by the Statute of
Ann, which has always been the received law here, to plead
double. Equity follows the law; and the peculiarly liberal prin-
ciples of our Code seem to require, that this Court should not be
more technical, or less willing than a Court of common law, to re-
ceive the defendant's defence in any number, or variety of forms
deemed necessary by him, to render it completely effectual; for the
reason why duplicity should not be allowed in the same plea, does
not apply as against several distinct pleas. 2 Mont. Dig. 89, 100.
Although a plea is not the only mode of defence in Chancery; and
there may not be as great a necessity to allow a defendant to plead
double in equity as at law; yet it is sufficient, that justice may in
most instances be promoted by it; and that no positive mischief is
likely to arise from it in equity more than at law. Long experience
has satisfied every one of its utility at law; and there is no ap-
parent sound reason which forbids the adoption of a similar prac-
tice in Courts of equity, (c)

(e) RIDGELY v. WAKFIELD.—1829, ch. 220.—This bill, filed 5th May, 1779,
states, that the plaintiff and defendant deduce their title to certain land
from a certain Richard Davis, but that the conveyance from one of the sons
and devisees of Davis to the defendant, had in fact conveyed to him more
than it was intended and meant to convey. Prayer, that the defendant
might be confined to the true extent of the grant, &c.—To this bill the de-
fendant presented the following defence.

The pleas and demurrer of Seth Warfield to the bill of complaint of Henry
Eidgely.—The said defendant by protestation, not confessing or acknowledg-
ing all or any of the matters or things in and by the said bill of complaint
set forth and alleged to be true, in such manner and form as the same are