462 ESTEP v. WATKINS.— 1 BLAND.

tiff's equity; but they attempt to circumscribe its operation by
setting up a previous understanding or agreement of the parties
to it, as to what was intended to be its extent and effect. But no
decree can be thus collaterally affected or impeached. Every de-
cree stands, and must be allowed to stand, for what it purports to
be on its face, until it has been revised or reversed in a solemn
and proper manner. 2 Nad. Chan. 537; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H.
& J. 204. Therefore, rejecting this ground of the defence, as being
utterly inadmissible, even supposing the fact of the alleged under-
standing to be true, there is nothing in the answers which is at all
at variance with the case presented by the bill.

It is certainly true as urged by the defendants' solicitor, that
even at the hearing, the plaintiff's case, as stated by himself, must
be shewn to have in substance, or in some essential bearing of it.
such a character as will confer jurisdiction on a Court of Chancery;
it must appear to be an equitable as contradistinguished from a
mere legal cause of action. The bill must itselt shew why it was
necessary, or allowable for the plaintiff to leave the ordinary legal
tribunals and come into a Court of Chancery to seek relief. It
seems to have been formerly understood, that if it appeared upon
the face of the bill, that the plaintiff's remedy was properly at
law,—as where the bill was for ths recovery of a debt due by
bond,—if the defendant answered and confessed the bond, he could
not demur to the relief; because, admitting the debt, he ought to
pay it, and not proceed to litigate it in either forum; or if the
plaintiff was proceeding for the recovery of damages, the defend-
ant might demur; because the Court could not settle the damages;
but if he answered, he could take no advantage of it at the hearing;
for having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, it would have
the quantum of damages adjusted in a feigned action at law. Gilb.
For. Rom.; North v. Strafford, 3 P. Will. 150; Pickering's Case, 12 Mod.
171. The rule now however is, that if the defendant could have de-
marred to the bill, * because of its not presenting a case of an
490 equitable character, but, instead of doing so, has answered
it, the Court will not make a decree for the relief at the final
hearing, Barker v. Dacie, 6 Fes. 686; Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Fes.
446; Brace v. Taylor, 2 Atk. 253; Horendm v. Annesley, 2 Scho. &
Lefr. 638; Utterson v. Mair, 2 Ves. Jun. 97; Brooke v. Hewitt, 3
Fes. 255; Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 245; Piggot v. Williams, 6 Mad.
95; Gorer v. Christie, 2 H. & J. 67; Taylor v. Ferywson, 4 H. &
J. 46; Pollard v. Patteron, 3 Hen. & Mun. 85; Yaney v. Fenwick,
4 Hen. & Mun. 423; Martin v. Spier, 1 Hayw. 370; Hart v. Mal-
lett, 2 Hayw. 130; Dickens v. Aslie, 2 Hayw. 176.

The case exhibited by this bill is, however, one of which a Court
Chancery may properly take cognizance. It is admitted on all
hands, that the assignee of a bond takes it subject to all the equity
to which the obligor is entitled, whether he has notice of that equity