FORNSHILL v. MURRAY.—1 BLAND. 457

pose of declaring a marriage, which has been thus terminated by
the death of either party, to have been null and void, for the pur-
pose of bastardizing the issue of such marriage, or barring the hus-
band of his courtesy, or the widow of her dower; nor can any one,
by any judicial proceeding be bastardized after his death, who had
carried the reputation of legitimate during his life; because wrongs,
and personal defects die with the individual; and the peace of
families and the nature of the testimony by which alone pedigrees
are capable of being traced, in cases where a party makes title by
* descent, require that there should be a limitation beyond
which the institution of any judicial proceeding for the pur- 484
pose of trying the validity of any marriage or the legitimacy of any
person ought not to be allowed. Co. Lilt. 33; 1 Hall. Const. Hist.
Eng. 395; Kenn's Case, 7 Co. 142; Hinks v. Harris, 4 Mod. 182;
Hemming v. Price, 12 Mod. 432; Hayden v. Gould, 1 Salic. 119;
Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 245; Elliott v. Gurr, 2 Phill. 16.
If these principles be correct, and as entirely applicable here, under
different forms of judicial proceeding, as in England, if follows,
that there can now, after the death of Mary, be no judicial pro-
ceeding had to declare her second and third marriages, with
Davidson and with Fulton, void for the purpose of bastardizing
her issue by either of them.

But the issue of Mary by her second and third marriages, which
were absolutely void, not merely voidable, are here claiming as
parties to this vsuit; and found their title to recover materially and
essentially upon the validity of those marriages, and their own
legitimacy as the fruit of them. In all such cases, where a party
claims as heir or next of kin, and his own legitimacy, or that of
the deceased under whom he claims, is thus necessarily involved,
and put in issue, it never has been questioned, that the Court
might inquire into and decide upon the validity of the marriage,
or the fact of legitimacy. This has been often done in England,
Alleyne v. Gray, 2 Salk. 437; Mace v. Cadell, Cowp. 233; Stark.
Ed. pt. 218, 931, and has also been allowed by the Courts of this
State; Cheseldine v. Brewer, 1 H. & McH. 152; Ferlet v. Gojon, 1
Hop. 494; because, wherever the validity of a marriage or the
legitimacy of a party forms a component part of the matter in
controversy, it becomes indispensably necessary, that the Court
should inquire into and determine upon that fact, as well as every
other part of the case; for otherwise it would be to suppose a suit
brought before a Court, which had not a capacity to try the cause.
1 Bac. Abr. 571. And upon that ground, although it is perfectly
well settled, that the Court of Chancery has no criminal jurisdic-
tion whatever, and is in its institution and forms of procedure
absolutely civil, yet if a bill be filed in it for the purpose of set-
ting aside a deed or to be relieved against a will on the ground
of fraud, the instrument complained of may be shewn to be a