FENWICK v. LAUGHLIN.—1 BLAND. 447

misapprehension in the judgment pronounced; therefore there is
no ground for a re-hearing.

But these claimants, after having had a formal hearing of their
case, upon all such facts and circumstances as they then deemed
pertinent or necessary; and, after having submitted it for a decision;
and, after their claims had been rejected, upon the ground of that
very objection of which they had full and timely notice, now ask
to have the order so passed, rescinded for the purpose of allowing
them to introduce other proofs, not now in the proceedings, to re-
move those objections, and in fact to give to their case an entirely
different complexion.

If such a course could be tolerated, under any circumstances,
there would be no stability in any decision whatever; for, there is
no case in which the parties might not have some pretext for in-
troducing additional proof, of some kind or other, to vary the case
in * some way, after the reasons and grounds of the judg-
ment of the Court had been fully explained andmade known. 474
Instead of the parties being obliged to bring all the facts and cir-
cumstances of their case at once before the Court, they would be
continually tempted to withhold some particulars, expressly with
a view to have it reconsidered and amended in those points where
they saw, from the opinion of the Court, that the law pressed most
against them. Such a course of proceeding would open a door to
the greatest frauds, and could not but be attended with the most
grievous expense and delay. Therefore as these claims have been
adjudicated upon, in the manner and upon the grounds on which
they had been advisedly and deliberately presented for decision,
I deem it improper now to suffer them to be again brought before
the Court in a new shape, on different principles, and other
proofs.

Whereupon it is ordered, that these petitions be and the same
are hereby dismissed with costs.

Prom this order as well as that of the 22nd of March there was
an appeal, and on the 6th December, 1831, the appeals were dis-
missed with costs.

FENWICK v. LAUGHLIN.

SALE OF DECEASED MORTGAGOR'S ESTATE.—DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS AMONG

GENERAL CREDITORS.

Where, on a bill by a mortgagee against the heirs of a deceased mortgagor,
the mortgaged estate had been sold to pay the mortgage debt, leaving a
surplus; other creditors of the deceased were allowed to come in, on
the ground of the insufficiency of the deceased's personal estate; con-