DORSEY v. HAMMOND.—1 BLAND. 445

Court; or to make any objections, such as the Statute of Limita-
tions, or the like, which can only come with propriety from a party
interested, and which, therefore, if made by the auditor alone,
will be disregarded.

But, notwithstanding a claim may have been formally vouched
and reported as clear of all apparent objections, yet any party
interested, a defendant or co-creditor, may deny it existence and
oppose its allowance altogether, in which case it must be regularly
and legally established, as upon an issue joined in a Court of law.

It has been found in practice, that there are several important
advantages in sending the case at once to the auditor, and having
an account stated. The claimants are immediately apprised of
what is wanted, if any thing, to sustain their claims: those against
which there is no objection may obtain satisfaction, or at least a
dividend without further delay. The heirs and each creditor are
informed of the nature of the distribution proposed to be made.
Each claim is presented in a clear and distinct point of view. The
debatable ground is designated, its extent reduced, and the pro-
gress of the cause accelerated.

The objections, that these claims No. 3, 4, and 5, are each of
them founded on such a judgment against the executor as carries
in itself conclusive evidence of a sufficiency of personal assets to
* satisfy them, goes to their merits, and unless clearly obvi-
ated, they must be rejected. These claimants do not allege, 472
that it will be in their power to remove this objection, by any
means whatever, but rest their case entirely upon the fact of its
having no foundation in equity. It is certain, that an absolute
judgment, obtained without mistake or fraud, is conclusive evi-
dence of a sufficiency of assets in the hands of the executor to
satisfy such judgment. Wheatley v. Lane, 1 Saund. 219, n. 8;
Skelton v. Haicling, 1 Wils. 258; Suffolk v. Harding, 3 Rep. Chan.
88; Ramsden v. Jackson, 1 Atk. 292; Greerside v. Benson, 3 Atk.
248; Robinson v. Bell, 2 Vern. 146; Rugylcs v. Sherman, 14 John.
446; Giles v. Ferryman, 1 H. & G. 168; Gaither v. Welch, 3 G. &
J. 259. The admission of the defendants in this case of the in-
sufficiency of the personal estate was made with reference to none
other than the claim of the originally suing creditor by whom it
was called for. Now it may be perfectly true, that the executor
has actually reserved assets to pay claims No. 3, 4, and 5; and, yet
no less true, that he has nothing left to meet the claim of this
plaintiff.

There is then nothing in this objection of the auditor incompat-
ible with the previous proceedings or acts of the Court; or which,
as has been urged, militates against the decree which was grounded
upon an alleged and admitted insufficiency of personal estate to
satisfy the claim of the plaintiff; for these claims No. 3, 4, and 5,
were not then before the Court.