JONES v. JONES.—1 BLAND. 429

be paid to the husband and wife, or to the husband alone. And
therefore, although the real estate of the wife had been converted
into an interest in the nature of an equitable chose hi action, that
is, into mere personal property of that description; yet, as the
husband had not reduced it into possession during his life-time, it
passed to the * personal representatives of the late feme
covert, not to those of her deceased husband. Leadenham 455
v. Nicholson, 1 H. & G. 275; Hammond v. Stier,2 G. & J. 81;
Cary v. Taylor. 2 Vern. 302.

A married woman, who is entitled to an undivided part of a real
estate, cannot be, in any way, deprived of it without her express
consent; which by the common law. can only be obtained by a
tine, or, under the Acts of Assembly, by her privy examination
and acknowledgment of a deed conveying it to another. From
necessity, and for the purpose of effecting a partition of a real
estate, which is incapable of division without loss, it may be sold
and converted into personalty. But a change of the nature of
property, in order to attain a particular object, should not divest
the owner of his right to it, to any extent whatever. The conver-
sion of a real estate into personalty, for the purpose of thereby
awarding to a feme covert, more fully and exactly than could other-
wise be done, her due share of it, ought not to be allowed to ope-
rate so as to impair her right to it, or to lessen her absolute con-
trol over it in any way whatever. When a married woman peti-
tions for, or consents to have a partition made of a real estate, in
which she is entitled to an undivided interest, and acquiesces in a
sale of it, for the purpose of making a just division of its value,
because of its being difficult, or impracticable to make a correct
partition of it in kind without mutual loss, she ought not to be
cousidered as having, thereby, virtually agreed to have her own
absolute right to her share transferred to another, or in any way
lessened or impaired. For ii that were the effect of the judicial
proceeding, then the inevitable consequences of a suit for a parti-
tion, in all such cases, would be, that the suit itself would operate
as a partial or total extinguishment of the rights and interest of
the feme covert. Because, if, by a sale, for the purpose of effect-
ing a partition, the wife's share is thereby converted into person-
alty, which her husband may, at pleasure and without her consent,
reduce into possession, the result will be, that she may thus be
divested of her real estate without her express consent; and even
if the husband were allowed so to take the wife's share as per-
sonalty, subject to what is called the wife's equity, then she could
only have a portion of it settled upon her; whereas the whole of
the proceeds of sale awarded to her are, in truth, but the substi-
tute for her realty; and therefore, to do her justice, the whole
should be settled upon her as land; unless she should expressly