422 JONES v. JONES.—1 BLAND.

or possession they may be found. March, 1778, c. 9, s. 6; Novem-
ber, 1787, c. 40. By which legislative enactment the State's lien,
as in England, relates not merely to the date of the judgment,
but to the commencement of the action. Whence it follows, that
the liability of the real estate of a debtor to the State to be taken
in execution, and the lien of the State, incident to such liability,
are founded upon the common law and the Acts of Assembly
passed in express relation to debts due to the State.
But the general rule of the common law in regard to the liability
of real estate to be taken in execution as between party and party,
was modified by a statute passed in the year 1285, 13 Ed. 1, c. 18,

which made such estates liable to be partially taken in execution.
This statute, which gave the writ of elegit, enlarged the remedy of
the creditor by declaring, that, when a debt was recovered or
damages adjudged, it should be in the election of the plaintiff to
have a fieri facias, or to have all the debtor's chattels and the one-
half of his lands delivered to him until the debt was levied to a
reasonable extent; 2 Inst. 394; which gave the election immediately
that the debt was recovered; and therefore the whole land was
held to be bound from the day of the rendition of the judgment;
and those concerned, it was presumed, might easily ascertain from
the record by what judgments the lands of the debtor were thus
bound. Gilb. Execu. 37. But as some inconvenience arose, be-
cause, according to the common law, judgments took effect by
relation from the first day of the term, it was in the year 1676 de-
clared by the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. c. 2, s. 14 & 15, that the
day on which judgments were rendered should be entered upon the
record; and that purchasers should be charged from such time only,
and not from the first day of the term whereof the judgment was en-
tered. This then was the nature and extent of the judicial lien, as
between party and party, with which the real estate of a debtor

part.—Chan. Records, Lib. P. L. 68, 317, 387, 392, 812, and 882; Kilty's Rep.
75, 205.

This, and other similar cases which might be adduced from the records,
shew, that the Court of Chancery of Maryland, before the Revolution, was,
in many instances, resorted to as a Court of Exchequer. And, in relation to
debts due to the State, it may be well to recollect, that, according to the Eng-
lish law, not only the real and personal estate of a public debtor are liable to
be taken in execution and sold for the satisfaction of the debt, but that the
State might also have, what is called, an extent in aid. or a process to be
levied upon debts due from others to the public debtor to the fourth degree;
thus taking in execution choses in action, and bringing the debtors of the
State's debtor before the Court to answer in a way similar to that of a gar-
nishes under a foreign attachment. Gilb. Exche. ch. 12; Petersd. Abri. tit.
Extent B. The Act of Congress of the 30th of April, 1818, ch. 78, s. 8, gives
a similar right, as against corporations, to the United States. The United
States v. Robertson, 5 Peters, 659.