WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.—1 BLAND. 413

or satisfied the plaintiff, that the personal property so taken in exe-
cution would pass to his executor or administrator as parcel of his
estate, which should be kept separate, and applied exclusively in
satisfaction of the claim for which it had been taken.

But the Act of 1813, ch. 102, s. 1, has provided somewhat dif-
ferently for this matter, by declaring, that where it appears by the
return of the late sheriff, that the real or personal property so
taken by him had not been sold, the Court may, on motion, order a
renditioni exponas to the new sheriff', upon which the property, which
had been so seized, may be taken wherever found, and sold as
upon the original execution.

This provision, however, extends only to cases where it appears
by the return, that the property taken in execution specifically
remains unsold; and therefore, where it does not so appear, or
where the sheriff had made sale and died before the money was
brought in or paid to the plaintiff, there, as the property or money
in his hands had passed to his personal representatives, they must
be held liable to the plaintiff' for whose benefit the execution
issued. And although no action can be maintained against the
executor of a sheriff grounded on the misfeasance or breach of
duty of his testator, yet the plaintiff may recover of the executor
of the sheriff, in an action of debt, any money which he had levied
under a fieri facias and had not paid over. Cleric v. Withers, 6
Mod. 299; Adair v. Shaw. 1 Scho. & Lefr. 265. In Maryland the
plaintiff would be allowed to recover his debt by a suit upon the
sheriff's bond, and then the sureties who had thus been compelled
to pay the debt would have a right to take the place of the plaintiff
as against the representatives of the sheriff.

Upon analogous principles, on the death of a receiver appointed
by this Court, it appears to be clear, that in so far as he had a
mere duty to perform, like that of a sheriff' in safely keeping his
prisoners, nothing could devolve upon his representatives; but that
where he had acquired a qualified interest in personal property as
a bailee, and which it was his duty to keep apart from his own,
and account for; and where he had, in obedience to an order, sold
and converted propertj into money, such property and money
must be considered as having rightfully passed into the hands of
his personal representatives, as the only, or the most sure means
of saving * harmless the estate of the deceased from the li-
ability to which he had subjected it, by becoming bound 438
as a receiver. Shelf. Lun. 151.

Hence considering the property and money which the late
receiver Jacob Schley had admitted to be in his hands, as having
passed into the hands of his administrators, they must be viewed
as standing in all respects in his place: and as the personal repre-
sentatives of their intestate, there can be no more impropriety in
proceeding against them in this Court by an order nisi, followed