402 WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.—1 BLAND.

according to the stipulations of their contract of co-partnership,
the term of its duration has not yet expired.

It seems to be admitted, where a specified period of time is

limited for the continuance of a partnership, that neither party

can, at his option alone, dissolve the connexion. But, although

such * a partnership cannot be terminated at the pleasure of

425 either party; yet, where, as in this instance, there is no ex-
press stipulation to the contrary, the partnership is virtually dis-
solved by the death of either of the parties. And it is said, that
in England the bankruptcy of one partner operates, like death, as
a virtual dissolution of the firm. In point of principle, and so far
as relates to the matter now under consideration, there can be no
difference between a bankruptcy, according to the English law,
and an actual insolvency in fact, according to our law. So long
as a man carries on his business and has a prospect of gain, he is
not considered as insolvent; but, if, in addition to such deficiency
of property, his business so far declines as to leave him no prospect
of paying his debts, he is then, according to the universal sense of
mankind, insolvent. Whether he is declared to be ia this condi-
tion according to the technical process of the English bankrupt
law, or is admitted to be so in fact, the effect upon the contract of
co-partnership must be the same. The insolvency is the total de-
struction of the pecuniary capacity of the partner to fulfil his con-
tract of co-partnership. But his pecuniary capacity was the basis
on which it rested. The contract itself, therefore, must be con-
sidered as effectually annulled, as if the party were dead. If both
of them be insolvent, or dead, there is no efficient or living capa-
city left to execute the contract; if one only be dead or insolvent,
the terms of it cannot be complied with; and where personal con-
fidence was the principal inducement for making the agreement;
as in contracts of this nature, it would be unreasonable; and,
therefore, the other party shall not have the executor, adminis-
trator, trustee or assignee of the deceased, or of the insolvent,
intruded upon him. Consequently, the partnership between these
parties must be considered as having been virtually and effec-
tually terminated by their insolvency. It can be extended over no
new transactions, nor be allowed to expand itself any more. It
must be wound up and brought to a close; and, except for such
purposes, must be deemed to have totally ceased to exist. Ex parte

Williams, 11 Ves. 5; Harding v. Glover, 18 Ves. 281; Vulliamy v.
Noble, 3 Meriv. 614; Crnwshay v. Maule, 1 Sican. 506.

While a man continues solvent, the order in which he pays his
creditors is a matter of indifference, since none can suffer; and
therefore, no one creditor has a right to complain of the prefer-
ence given to another. But so soon as he becomes insolvent, that

* privileges ceases; and equity requires, that he should make

426 an equal distribution of his effects among them all. The