392 WILL1AMSON v. WILSON.—1 BLAND.

The bill in this case was filed by one partner against his copartners, charg-
ing them with a design to waste the joint property, or to apply it to their

of all concerned in the cause, and not of one party exclusively. He merely
retains possession of the property for the benefit of the party ultimately en-
titled to it. R. R. v. R. R. no Md. 156; Ellicott v. Warford, 4 Md. 80; Chase's
Case. 1 Bland, 200; Ellicott v. Ins. Co. 7 Gill, 307; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace,
218. The power is a delicate one which should be exercised with extreme
caution, and only under circumstances requiring summary relief. Furlong
v. Edwarrds. 3 Md. 99. But in many instances, especially in partnership
transactions wiieie after dissolution the parties cannot agree upon an ad-
justment and the funds are in the bands of one partner alone, cases must
arise for the appointment of a receiver. Slights v. Peters 9 Gill, 472.

In Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Md. 374. the following rules in regard to the
appointment were laid down. 1. That the power of appointment is a deli-
cate one, and to be exercised with great circumspection. 2. That it must
appear that the claimant has a title to the property, and the Court must be
satisfied by affidavit that a receiver is necessary to preserve the property.
3. That there is no case in which the Court appoints a receiver merely be-
cause the measure can do no harm. 4. That fraud or imminent danger, if the
intermediate possession should not be taken by the Court, must be clearly
proved. 5. That unless the necessity be of the most stringent character, the
Court will not appoint until the defendant is first heard in response to the
application. These rules are approved in Triebert v. Burgess, 11 Md. 461;
Haight v. Burr, 19 Md. 134; Voshell v. Hynson, 26 Md. 92. In 3 Pomeroy Eq.
Jur. sec. 1331, note 8, it is said that although the above rules have been fre-
quently quoted as a correct generalization, they "must be taken with some
reservations; they are certainly too strong to be of universal application,
especially the fourth. There are classes of cases in which a receiver is
appointed almost as a matter of course, although no fraud nor imminent
danger is proved."

In Whitman v. Robinson. 21 Md. 43, the Court said that the rules laid down
in Blondheim v. Moore, were inapplicable. ''That was a bill filed by a credi-
tor, and the interference of the Court was invoked to divest the possession
of property from one having the legal estate and to place it in the hands of
a receiver, and in such case it was held that fraud or imminent danger must
be proved: here, the application is made by one having the legal estate, en-
titled to an equal right in the possession. The bill, answer and exhibits
show that the appellant and appellee were co-partners, equally in interest in
the property and business of the firm. By the articles, no time was limited
for the continuance of the partnership; and it was therefore liable to be dis-
solved at the instance of either party. The bill alleges that it was dissolved
by consent on 31 December, 1863; this is denied by the answer, but it mani-
festly appears that a dissolution was then contemplated and imminent, and
it is conceded that the filing of the bill operated a dissolution. The proceed-
ings also disclose a serious, and apparently irreconcilable disagreement be-
tween the parties, both as to the control and disposition of their property
and effects, and their respective claims and demands against each other.
Under these circumstances the action of the Circuit Court in continuing the
injunction and appointing receivers was. in our opinioc. a provident exer-
cise of equity power, sanctioned by the authorities and demanded by the
exigencies of the case.''

In Shannon v. Wright, 60 Md. 323. and Haight v. Burr, 19 Md. 130, it was
held that the bills set out such cases of danger to the complainants' interest