388 MACKUBIN v. BROWN.—1 BLAND.

Any further sale of the real estate of the late Basil Brown to
satisfy the claims of Marriott, Shipley, and Vansant, is opposed
by Stockett and wife on several grounds.

First, they rely upon the lapse of time as affording a presump-
tion, that those claims were either satisfied or abandoned. But
the fact, that these claimants were infants, and have but lately
attained their full age, furnishes a satisfactory answer to this ob-
jection.

Secondly, they allege, that the personal estate of the late Basil
Brown, in the hands of his, administrators was amply sufficient to
satisfy these claims and ought to have been so applied: and that
these claimants cannot be allowed to proceed against his real
estate until the personalty has been exhausted. This objection, if
it had been sustained by the fact, would have been conclusive
against the passing of the decree for the sale of his real estate.
But, it is now entirely too late to make such an objection, after a
decree expressly grounded upon an admitted or established allega-
tion of the insufficiency of the personal estate to pay all the debts
of the deceased. After such a decree no creditor, who may in all
other respects be entitled to come in, can be turned away from
proceeding against the real estate to seek payment out of the pei-
sonal estate of his deceased debtor.

A third objection is, that these claimants should not be permitted
to come in as creditors against the estate of the late Basil Brown:
because, although he sold, he did not receive payment for the
whole of the estate of the late William Hammond: and these
claimants can only be considered as creditors of Basil Brown upon
the ground, that he received those proceeds, a portion of which
had been allotted to each of them. And it is also alleged, that a
part of those proceeds were collected by Matthias Hammond, one
of the administrators of Brown, atter his death.

It has been the practice of the Court to allow a trustee to make
the sale in a manner, and upon terms different from those specified
in the decree, where the interests of the parties appear to be in no
way injured by doing' so. Aud those concerned being always noti-
fied to shew cause, if any they have, why the sale should not be
ratified, it has been found, that much good and no material injury
has arisen by sanctioning deviations to this extent by trustees.
The trustee is always directed by a decree, authorizing a sale upon
credit, to bring into Court the bonds or notes taken by him to
secure the * payment of the purchase money. And this he
416 should never fail to do, if it be not attended with much in-
convenience, where the credit is long; because he thereby relieves
himself from any responsibility by holding them; and enables the
Court, in those cases where any of the parties, may and choose to
take the bonds in satisfaction of their claims, to have them, at
once assigned and delivered over to them; and thus immediately