372 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND.

ant, in the most full and comprehensive terms, the whole and en-
tire estate real and personal of the plaintiff, without condition or
reservation of any kind whatever. It professes to have been made
for value received, but was in fact signed without the least valu-
able consideration; and, if sustained, would leave the plaintiff
utterly destitute and pennyless. At the time of the execution of
this deed the plaintiff was upwards of eighty-four years of age;
and was then, and had been for some time previous in a state of
general dotage: and besides, was at the time suffering under an
attack of erysipelas, that grievously affected her mental faculties,
from which attack she could not have immediately recovered a
perfectly sound state of mind, even after that bodily disease had
intermitted or passed off. and which disorder must have consider-
ably accelerated the previously commenced devastations of age.
Attorney-General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 443; 1 London Jurist
340: Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413. This deed must therefore be
annulled, as well because the plaintiff was, at The time it was exe-
cuted, actually non compos mentis; as on the ground, that it was
obtained by the most gross abuse of confidence, and by a fraudu-
lent combination; for, as it has been truly, said, fraud and deceit
by him who is trusted, is most odious in law. Fermor's Case. 3
Co. 79.

Thus far the plaintiff will obtain all the equity she asks. But
he who asks equity must do equity. The plaintiff herself seems
to admit in her bill, when taken in connexion with her late hus-
band's will, which she exhibits as a part of it, that she stands
here in some sort encumbered with an equity due to the defendant.
And the only difference between these parties as to that claim is
as to its extent. The defendant claims an absolute estate in fee
simple in the property of the plaintiff after her death. While, on
the other hand, the plaintiff insists, that the defendant's clai?n
extends no further than a life estate with remainder to her lawful
children, should she have any.

The bill states, that the plaintiff was seized in fee simple of a
tract of land called "John & Thomas' Forest;" that at an early
period of her life she married John C. Owings, who made his will,
* which is exhibited as a part of the bill, and died in Febru
398 ary, 1810; that the plaintiff had intended, by her last will,
to make some sufficient provision for the defendant, the nature of
which is thus described. After some specific legacies to the
plaintiff's children and grandchildren, to give the defendant an
estate for life in her real property, the residue of her personal
estate, and a remainder in the real estate to the defendant's chil-
dren should she have any; and in the event of failure of issue
lawfully begotten, then to the other children of the plaintiff to be
equally divided among them. That the defendant being wholly
dissatisfied with such a provision, and insisting on an uncondi-