360 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE—1 BLAND.

ney-General v. Parnther, 3 Sro. C. C. 441. In cases of this sort,
the evidence of medical men is, in general, produced; and, in pro-
portion to the great improvements in that branch of science, such
evidence is now more than ever to be relied upon. Sherwood v.
Sanderson, 19 Ves. 286; 1 Part. & Fonb. 315; Shelf. Lnn. 70. I
therefore deem it a sufficient answer to this argument, derived
from considerations of public policy, to deny the truth of the fact
upon which it is based; and to rely upon the circumstance, that if
there ever had been any such foundation for it, we should not, at
this day, be at a loss to find any clear evidence of those facts in
any foreign Code, or in the * innumerable English reported
384 adjudications in relation to the subject of insanity.

It is admitted, that many of the wise and sound maxims of the
law are founded on considerations of public policy. But it by no
means follows, that they are each of them similar and in principle
alike; or that they do, in any respect, sustain each other by anal-
ogy. Upon considerations of public policy, the law will not per-
mit the verity of certain public acts and judicial records to be
called in question; but the foundation of that rule, it is evident, is
very different; indeed it is admitted to be directly contrary from
that of this maxim, in relation to contracts. 1 Pow. Cont. 22.

Upon the whole, I am clearly of opinion, that this English rule,
which declares, that a man shall not stultify himself by his own

plea, never has been, and ought not to be considered as a part of
the law of Maryland. And having thus disposed of this prelimi-
nary point, upon the determination of which the nature of the
further investigation of this case so essentially depended, I feel
myself now at liberty to take every view of it which the pleadings
and proof will warrant; and to dispose of it upon the established
rules of equity, and the broad principles of natural justice: and

shall proceed accordingly.

Before I go into an examination of the proofs, it seems to be
proper that something should be said respecting the general nature
of insanity, or that unsound condition of the human mind, to
which so large a portion of the testimony relates; and, upon a just
conception of which infirmity, a correct, determination of this case
so mainly depends. "Madness," says Sir William Scott, "is a
state of mind not easily reducible to correct definition, since it is
the disorder of that faculty with which we are little acquainted;
for all the study of mankind has made but a very moderate pro-
gress in investigating the texture of the mind, even in a sound
state. In disease, where it has pleased the Almighty to envelope
the subject-matter in the darkness of disease, it will probably
always continue so; but the effects of this disordered state are
pretty well known. We learn from experience and observation all
that we can know, and we see that madness may subsist in various
degrees, sometimes slight, as partaking rather of disposition or