334 DORSET u. CAMPBELL.—1 BLAND.

But the contract informs us, that the payment was to be made,
"in bonds, notes, and other claims, indorsed by C. Dorsey, Esq.:1'
and also that Dorsey expressly says, "lam responsible for their
eventual solvency.'1 The fair, clear sense of these expressions
removes every difficulty. Dorsey was to have the privilege of

* paying out of a designated fund, to be placed in the hands,
358 and at the disposal of Campbell & Ritchie; but he was to
warrant, that, with due and proper diligence on their part in en-
deavoring to make it available, it would be ultimately productive
to the whole amount of the purchase money. It does not appear,
that Campbell & Ritchie are chargeable with any want of diligence
in endeavoring to collect the money due on the choses in action
transferred to them. Boyer v. Turner, 3 H. & J. 285.

It would seem, from the expressions of the contract, that Dor-
sey was to be allowed a reasonable time to assign, and deliver to
Campbell & Ritchie, or their agent, choses in action, out of which
they were to collect the amount stipulated to be paid to them; but
that time has elapsed; and indeed, Dorsey, by bringing this suit
has virtually waived the privilege of referring the defendants tor
payment to any choses in action in addition to those he had already
transferred to them.

This case, then, stands thus:—Dorsey must be charged with the
sum of fourteen hundred and sixty-two dollars and fifty cents with
interest from the eighth day of June, eighteen hundred and fifteen;
first deducting therefrom the amount of the incumbrances on the
land; that is, the judgment against Anderson, the former owner,
and also the taxes due when Dorsey got possession. Dorsey is
then to be credited with the sums actually received by Campbell
& Ritchie from the chosen in action transferred to them. And,
since the object of this mode of payment was merely to prevent
Dorsey from being called on until Campbell & Ritchie had used
every proper exertion to make the specific funds available, Dorse\
is only to be accredited with the net proceeds of the clioses in ac-
tion received by Campbell & Ritchie, or their attorney, after allow-
ing every legal discount or set-off, and expense of collection on
each one. No expense or charge, however, is to be allowed for
paying over any money so received, from the attorney of Camp-
bell & Ritchie to them. But the credit is to be given to Dorsey as
a payment on the day on which such proceeds were received,
either by Campbell & Ritchie, or their attorney. If any of the
debtors chargeable by the choses in action assigned by Dorsey, have
been ascertained to be wholly or partially insolvent, he must be
charged to that amount.

With these explanations and determinations as to the principles

* of this case, it is hereby referred to the auditor, with
359 directions to state an account accordingly, preparatory to a
final decree.