GIBSON v. TILTON.—1 BLAND. 331

alone who ask or accept such assistance can have the authority to
regulate its nature, form and extent. And they have accordingly
laid it down as a general rule, that such acts, although varying in
form in each case according to circumstances, must yet contain all
the requisites essential to such acts when done here. Tidd Pro.
156. But the Court, in such cases, is not called on to give any
faith, or credit, or to pass any opinion upon the effect of a judicial
proceeding of another State. If it were, then that matter having
been regulated by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
it certainly would be bound to submit to those regulations so far
as they applied. But the question, how far this Court will ask for,
or accept of affidavits taken in another State, as the medium of
that * evidence without which it will not act, is one of a
totally different nature from that, which involves the verity 355
or effect of a judicial proceeding, which had been originated and
completed entirely in another State; and with the formation of
which it could have no concern. The Constitution, and Act of
Congress of the United States, therefore, can have no bearing
upon the subject now under consideration.

With regard to the affidavit to this answer, it is certainly not
couched in phraseology as full and exact as it ought to have been.
But it is conceived to be expressed in terms sufficiently clear and
strong to sustain a prosecution for perjury, if it had been made in
this State, and the answer had been found to be false in any
material particular. And although, as it would seem, no such
prosecution could be sustained here upon a false oath taken in
another State however correct and positive the affidavit might
have been; yet the parties may, should the answer turn out to be
false or the affidavit be ascertained to be spurious, be punished for
practising an imposition on the Court. Omealy v. Newell, 8 East,
372.

These preliminary objections being removed, it appears, on a
careful consideration of the answer, that it is, in all respects, suffi-
cient: and that it has completely sworn away all the equity of the
complainant's bill.

I know of no such rule as that which was insisted on by the
plaintiff's solicitor; that where the facts on which the complain-
ant's equity rests are alike within the knowledge of both parties;
and the allegation of them by each in an opposite bearing is
equally positive, the injunction must be continued. The rule is,
that on a motion to dissolve, the facts on which the plaintiff's
equity rests must be admitted or not denied, or he cannot obtain a
continuance of the injunction. But if they are positively denied
by the answer the injunction must be dissolved. Eden Inj. 86.
There may be exceptions to this rule, but this case is not one of
them.