CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND. 319

The next question therefore is, whether, according to the nature
of the contract between Bryden and Chase he was chargeable with
interest, and from what time? It has been insisted, that Chase
ought to be charged with interest from the date of his contract,
and * to sustain this position very great reliance has been
placed upon a numerous class of cases, which show, that 341
in equity a purchaser who takes, or has been let into possession
and receives the rents and profits shall be charged with interest.
Sug. Ven. & Pur. 354; 1 Mad. Chan. 441. But none of those cases
are like the one under consideration. Here it appears, that the
lessor, Chase, purchased an outstanding claim from the lessee for
which he paid 86,000, down at that time, and stipulated to pay
$6,000 more, six months after the delivery of certain papers relin-
quishing that claim. Shortly after which time he was let into the
receipt of the additional rent from the sub-tenant. It appears,
therefore, that he was let into that receipt, by reason of the first
payment. And, consequently, the second payment cannot be
affected in any manner whatever by that change; even suppos-
ing it not to have been within the contemplation and purview of
that contract by which it was stipulated to be made. Hence this
question about interest must rest altogether and exclusively upon
that contract, and upon that alone.

By this contract Chase was to give his negotiable notes payable
six months after the delivery of the papers. All negotiable notes
carry interest from the day they fall due. To this general rule
there are i'ew if any exceptions. Had not the attachment been
interposed, it is to be presumed that this contract would have been
fulfilled by each of the parties exactly, according to its terms. If
so, the papers would have been delivered to Chase on the 17th of
July, 1812, and he would have then given his negotiable notes
payable six months thereafter, which would have borne interest
when they fell due, and not before. The attachment did not alter
Chase's contract, or place him in any worse condition, than he
would have stood before; it only commanded him to pay Manhardt
insisted of Bryden; and, although it obliged him to pay all, prin-
cipal and interest, it could not compel him to pay sooner, or to pay
more than he stipulated to pay Bryden. It is an established prin-
ciple, that where goods are sold to be paid for by a bill of exchange,
and the purchaser neglects to give the bill, the vendor is entitled
to interest from the time the bill if given, would have become
due. De Bernales v. Fuller, 2 Camp. 428, note; Porter v. Palsgrave,
2 Camp. 472; Boyce v. Warburton 2 Camp. 480. This covenant
"to give good negotiable notes,"in effect then, amounts to an
express stipulation to pay interest from the * day they would

have become due if they had been given. Consequently 342
Chase must be charged with interest from the 17th of January,
1813, the day when the notes would have become due had they