CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND. 317

When the jury was sworn to try the issue on. the plea of nulla
bona, the papers, which Bryden had stipulated to deliver, were
produced; to show that he had complied with the contract on his
part; and that, in consequence thereof, Chase had become his
debtor for the sum of $6,000, with interest thereon. And it being
believed and supposed, by the attorneys, David Hoffman and John
Purviance, (for they alone conducted the trial,) that the principal
and interest of the debt due from Chase to Bryden amounted to
$9,326.62, the jury were permitted or directed to find a verdict for
that sum; upon which a judgment was rendered.

Soon after this judgment was obtained, Chase complained to
David Hoffman, the attorney for Manhardt, and also to John Pur-
viance, that it had been obtained for much more than was really
due, even if he were chargeable with interest; but that he ought
not to have been, and could not lawfully be charged with interest
at all, according to the terms of his contract. Upon which those
attorneys both insisted, that he was chargeable with interest from
the date of the purchase. But they agreed, that if it should appear
*on a calculation and review of the proceedings, that he had
been charged with too much, the excess should be remitted. 339
Indeed they, admitted, that there was an excess which had occurred
by mistake; which error should certainly be corrected. Chase did
not then assert, that he owed nothing to Bryden; or that, accord-
ing to the terms of his contract, he could not, at that time, have
been legally considered as the debtor of Bryden. It was not until
some time after, that he objected to a judgment having been ren-
dered, at that time, for either principal or interest, on the ground,
that Bryden had failed to comply with the contract on his part.

It appears, that the policies of insurance had been regularly
transferred by Bryden according to the terms of the contract with
Chase, on the 11th of April, 1812; and that the papers alluded to
in the contract of the 26th of March, 1812, were retained by John
Purviance for some time, and are now filed in this case as exhibits
referred to in the answer of David Hoffman.

These facts and circumstances have been collected from the bill,
answers, exhibits and proofs; they are all that have any material
bearing upon the matter now in controversy; other particulars will
be noticed in the course of the investigation.

It does not appear, from any tiling in these proceedings, what
was the nature and extent of Richard M. Chase's interest in the
property called The Fountain Inn; but it is quite certam that the
contract of the 26th of March, 1812, was made between this com-
plainant Samuel Chase and James Bryden only;—that no other
persons were immediately parties thereto. The complainant says
in his bill, that he agreed with Bryden to purchase of him that
property; and in the agreement itself he says, " agree that on
James Bryden's delivering to me," &c. Hence it is clear, that,