304 CTJNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.—1 BLAND.

to recollect, that the proceedings by caveat in the Orphans' Court;
Dep. Com. Git. 160; 1798, eh. 101, sub-ch. 2, s. 9; as derived from
the Ecclesiastical Courts of England; 1 Jac. Law Dict. 407; is
essentially different from the caveat in Chancery against the
emanation of a patent. And the term caveat has in our judicial
proceedings been applied in other cases as an admonition to the
Court not to do certain acts, to which a party objected, until he

could be heard; as not to record depositions taken under a commis-
sion to mark and bound lands; Roch v. Giles, 1 H. & McH. 186; or
not to enter up a judgment or pass a decree upon an award, and
the like. Dorsey v. Jeoffray, 3 H. & McH. 121; Shelf, Lun. &
Idiots, 104. 054, 024; In matter of Fust, 1 Cox, 418.

"We may now pass on to the consideration of the case brought
before the Court by this caveat in the land office.

According to the known and long established principles upon
which public lands may be acquired by an individual from the
State, the title commences with the designation of the tract by the
purchaser. After the date of the designation, and before a grant
has been issued, the fille is inchoative, and imperfect; but when a
grant has been obtained, the title is then absolute and complete.
A sufficient description of the land intended to be secured gives an
* incipient title against every person who has not before

325 taken some method to secure the same land. Land Ho. Ass.
461. It is held, upon common law principles, that the grant relates
back to the date of the specification; and, by a kind of jux post-
liminii, the purchaser is deemed to have had a perfect legal title
from that period to all intents and purposes whatever. 3 Blue.
Com. 210. He may maintain an action of trespass for any injury
done to the land within that interval of time; Chapline v. Harrey,
3 H. & McH. 396; and he may, in that interval, if he has paid the
whole caution money, obtain a warrant of re survey, which is only
incident to a legal title, and cannot be founded upon a mere
equitable right of any kind. Land Ho. Ass. 152,149, 420, 427, 447,
455. On the death intestate of the holder of such an imperfect
legal title, the right descends to his heirs, as real estate, to whom
alone the patent can be granted. This doctrine of relation is
founded upon principles of common law altogether and exclusively.
Lloyd v. Tilghman, 1 H. & McH. 85; Spalding v. Reeder, 1 H. &
McH. 189; Hath's Lesaee v. Polk, 1 H. & McH. 363; Report of D.
Dulany, 1 H. & McH. 553; Kelly's .Lessee v. Greenfield, 2 H. & McH.
133; West v. Hughes, 1 H. & J. 13; Beall's Lessee v. Beall, 1 H. &
J. 347. There are, however, some cases in which this imperfect
title, which precedes the grant, is spoken of as being an equitable
interest. Howard v. Cromwell, 4 H. & McH. 329, & 1 H. & J. 118;
Ringgold v. Mallott, 1 H. & J. 317; Beall's Lessee v. Beall, 1 H. & J.
348. But that cannot properly be called an equitable title, which
a Court of equity cannot enforce, or have specifically executed.