302 CUNNINGHAM v. BROWNING.—1 BLAND.

land as in England; insomuch so as to leave little room to doubt,
that the law and the forms of proceeding of Maryland, in relation
to the making out of grants, and the proceeding by caveat, were

of the hearing. The defendant, James Coleston, now appears here, in per-
son, and prays the Chancellor to proceed to a decision.

As Mr. Hopper's application for a postponement is principally grounded
on the idea, that the Chancellor may direct new evidence to be taken, before
he decides, in the same manner, as if he were about to exercise an original
jurisdiction, this ground must certainly fail. An appellate jurisdiction has
to decide merely whether or not the inferior jurisdiction gave a just decision
on the case before it. Were the appellate jurisdiction to admit new proofs,
it would decide on a case, different from that which was before the lower
tribunal; and therefore, it would not appear, from its decision, whether the
first decision was right or wrong.

The Chancellor proceeded to examine the transcript, with a view of being
informed of the nature of the case. Mr. Hopper had, in his letter, stated,
that indisposition would prevent his attendance on this day. It was the
Chancellor's intention, if the case should appear difficult, or if the tran-
script should be materially defective, to postpone the decision.

It is certain, that the plat, for illustration, ought to have been part of the
proceedings, transmitted to this office; but the full perspicuous statement,
made hy the Judge enables the Chancellor to understand the case as fully
without, as with the plat; and there seems to be not the least difficulty in
the case, every point therein having long since been settled in this office.

A question indeed might be made, whether or not an Appellate Court can
give relief to an appellee; that is to say. whether or not the said Court ought
not to confine itself to the question, whether or not the appellant is entitled
to relief. But the High Court of Appeals, in the case of Scott against Chap-
line, gave relief to Scott, who was satisfied, and did not appeal, against
Chapline who was dissatisfied, and therefore did appeal. But setting this
precedent aside, the Chancellor conceives it his duty to rectify mistakes in
whatever way he may be apprised of them: and particularly to have the
rales here established to prevail on the Eastern Shore.

The Judge of the Eastern Shore Land Office in effect has said, that Cole-
ston could, under his warrant, survey no land which did not correspond to
the description or location of his warrant. But it has been here long since
settled, that a special warrant shall be allowed to do every thing, which a
common warrant might do. It appears, that a common warrant might have
affected any part of the vacancy comprehended in Coleston's certificate, that
is to say, that no other warrant affected it: and therefore it is rightly com-
prehended in Coleston's certificate. The Chancellor is glad of an opportu-
nity of informing the Judge of the Eastern Shore Land Office of an import-
ant point, of which the said Judge could not reasonably be supposed to be
apprised: and which whether it be right or wrong the present Chancellor
did not decide. It was in fact decided under the former Government.

Under a common warrant any uncultivated vacant land, not before sur-
veyed, or located, may be affected. A special warrant of vacant cultivation
is intended to affect a particular vacancy described in the warrant. If it
accurately describes the vacancy, it effectually binds it against all subse-
quent warrants or locations. But nothing is better established than this,—
that a special warrant of vacant cultivation may abandon its first intention
and may be used to affect any lands, which may be affected by a common