270 OGDEN ». OGDBN.—1 BLAND.

Warlters, 5 _East, 10; Stadt v. Lill, 9 East, 348; Randall v. Morgan,
12 Ves. 74.

* In cases of this kind the defendant may be compelled to
288 answer fully to all the material allegations of the bill, whether
he insists upon the benefit of the Statute of Frauds or not. But,
if the statute is relied on, there can be no decree for the plaintiff,
although the parol agreement should be admitted by the answer;
and, consequently, to obtain relief, in such case, the plaintiff must
either prove an agreement completely in writing, or such a part
performance of the parol agreement admitted by the answer, as
will fake the case out of the statute. But if the defendant does
not say any thing about the statute, then he must be taken to
have renounced the benefit of it. Whitchwuch v. Bevis, 2 Bro. C. C.
567; Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Fes. 37; Blagden v. Bradbear, 12 Ves.
471; Rowe v. Teed, 15 Ves. 375.

The sole question is, then, whether the late Amos Ogden, did
sign an agreement in writing in consideration of this marriage,
binding himself to give his niece Nancy, a marriage portion of
twelve thousand dollars as is alleged; or whether there has been
such a part performance as should induce the Court to enforce a
compliance with any parol agreement to that effect.

Marriage alone is not considered as a part performanee of a
contract of this nature; Taylor v. Beech, 1 Ves. 297; yet if a per-
son writes a letter promising to give a fortune with his daughter
or niece to a man if he should marry her; and, under the encour-
agement oi the letter, the man does marry her, he shall recover;
the agreement having been executed, as far as it could be, on his
part, tfeagood v. Me«7e, Prec. Cha. 560. And such a letter ad-
dressed to the father, or a iriend of the man, on his behalf, will
be as obligatory as if addressed to the mau himself. Moore v.
Hart. 1 Vern. 201; Welford v. Beezley, 1 Ves. 6; S. C. 3 Atk. 503.
But here, as no parol agreement has been admitted or proved, it
will be unnecessary to say what should be deemed a binding' par-
tial performance of a contract in consideration of marriage.

The whole of this case rests upon the letter of the 22d of May,
1817. If that cannot be considered as an agreement within the
meaning of the Statute of Frauds, there is an end of the case.
The cases in which letters have been considered as constituting
such an agreement, have gone fully as far, perhaps farther, than
a just construction of that statute will warrant. They all, how-
ever, go upon the principle, that the Court must be satisfied by a
fair interpretation of the letters, that they import a concluded
agreement; or afford sufficient materials for a more formal agree-
merit. *But if it be reasonably doubtful, whether what
289 passed was only a treaty, let the progress towards the con-
fines of an agreement be more or less, or if it be doubtful, whether
the language used was intended as expressive of an agreement,