266 OGDEN v. OGDBN.—1 BLAND.

Such a letter addressed to the father, or to a friend of the man, on his be-
half, will be as, obligatory as if addressed to the man himself.

In this case it was held that there was no agreement to make a settle-
ment; the letter in question not having been an inducement to the mar-
riage, nor creating an obligation on the part of the writer to give a por-
tion to his niece, (b)

A defendant may be compelled to answer fully to all the material allega-
tions of the bill, whether he insists upon the benefit of the Statute of
Frauds or not. But, if the statute is relied on, there can be no decree
for the plaintiff, although the parol agreement should be admitted by
the answer; and consequently, to obtain relief in such case, the plain-
tiff must either prove an agreement completed in writing, or such a
part performance of the parol agreement admitted by the answer, as
will take the case out of the statute. But if the defendant does not say
anything about the statute, then he must be taken to have renounced
the benefit of it. (c)

This bill was filed in Baltimore County Court, on the 7th of
June, 1818, by John W. Ogden and wife, to recover of the repre-
sentatives of their late uncle Amos Ogden, a marriage portion,
which the bill alleges, he had promised to give her. After the
answers had come in, and testimony had been collected, under a
commission issued from that tribunal, the case was removed to this
Court under the Act of 1824, ch. 196, and the proceedings filed
here on the 15th of May, 1826. Some time after which the case
was brought on for a final decision. All the circumstances are
fully and carefully stated by the Chancellor.

BLAND. C., 5th June, 1827.—This case standing ready for hear-
ing, and the solicitors of the parties having been heard, the pro-
ceedings were read and considered.

(6) Distinguished in Bowie v. Bonne, 1 Md. 96. In Pollock on Contracts. 27,
reference is made to the case of Moorehouse v. Colvin, 15 Beav. 341, where a
testator, having made a will by which he left a considerable legacy to his
daughter, wrote a letter in which he said, after mentioning her other ex-
pectations, " this is not all; she is and shall be noticed in my will, but to what
further amount I cannot precisely say." The legacy was afterwards revoked.
It was contended on behalf of the daughter's husband, to whom the letter
had, with the testator's authority, been communicated before the marriage,
that there was a contract binding the testator's estate to the extent of the
legacy given by the will as it stood at the date of the letter. But it was
held that the testator's language expressed nothing more than a vague in-
tention, although it would have been binding had it referred to the specific
sum then standing in the will, so as to fix that sum as a minimum to he
expected at all events. " He expressly promisee such provision only as he
in his will and pleasure shall think fit. If, on her marriage, the testator
had said, 'I will give to my child a proper and sufficient provision,' the
Court might ascertain the amount; but if the testator had said, ' I will give
to my child such a provision as I shall choose,' would it be proper for the
Court, (if he gave nothing,) to say what he ought to have given ?"

(c) See Lingan v. Henderson, ante, 236, note (a); Winn v. Albert, 2 Md. Ch.
169.