262 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND.

bility has devolved upon all these defendants; and therefore, as
no one of them has the power alone to make a new contract upon
the same terms so as, in like manner, to bind all the others; so no
tacit admission, or acknowledgment, or even express promise of
any one of them can be received as sufficient to take the case out
of the Statute of Limitations, if it shall appear to have been
properly applied and relied upon by this defendant, Richard Hen-
derson alone.

* From their nature, pleadings in equity do not in gene-
280 ral admit of the same precision as pleadings at law; but in
equity, as well as at law, the pleadings must be substantially suffi
cient. The plaintiff is not tied down to any particular form of
stating his case in his bill: for, however loosely or awkwardly its
statements may be made, yet he may obtain the relief he seeks,
if, upon a fair reading of the whole, it appears, that a sound case
has been substantially set forth. But if a defendant in equity
puts in a plea, considerable precision is required; because he there-
by proposes to reduce his case to a single point. Carew v. Jonn-
ston, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 305; Rowe v. Teed, 15 Yea. 377. And there-
fore, as to pleas in equity, there does not appear to be any mate-
rial difference between the rules of a Court of common law, and
those of a Court of Chancery. Where the ease, as stated in the
bill, appears to involve several distinct subjects as component
parts of one complex whole and the defendant offers a plea in bar,
it must be so framed as to be exactly applicable to the case; for if
it be impossible to know to which of the several siibjccts spoken
of in the bill it precisely refers, it will be deemed bad in form as
well as in substance. Meder v. Bert, Gibb. Eq. Rep. 185; Talbott
v. May, 3 Atk. 18. So too a plea in equity, as well as at law, must
tender a material issue; it must not only reduce the defence
to a single point, but that point must be of such a nature as,
when determined, will enable the Court to put an end to the
case. Jones v. Davis. 16 Ves. 2G4; Morrison v. Tumour, 18 Fes.
181; Steff v. Andrews, 2 Mad. Rep. 5; Co. Litt. 126. In equity,
as at law, a plea of the Statute of Limitations must be properly
applicable to the particular nature of the case; as where a note
was given for the payment of an annuity daring the life of the
annuitant, the defendant pleading, that he did not promise to pay
within six years is bad; he should have pleaded the cause of action
hath not accrued within the six years. 3 Atk. 70; Gould v. John-
son, 2 Salk. 422. And so, in an action of trespass, the statutory
limitation to which is four years, where the defendant, instead of
relying upon that lapse of time as a bar, pleaded not guilty within
six years; the plea upon demurrer was held bad; because it did
not precisely disclose, and rely upon that which had been made a
bar by the statute. Blackmore v. Tiddertey, 2 Ld. Raym. 1099;
Macfadzen v. Olerant, G .East, 389. Whence it appears to be neces-