LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND. 259

may rightfully direct any defence against it which goes to shew,
that neither he himself, nor any one of his co defendants, ought
to be charged by it; and if he succeeds in establishing such a de-
fence, the plaintiff's bill must be totally dismissed.

Hence it is obvious, that this class of cases, in which the Court
may find it necessary or proper, because of their peculiar circum-
stances, to pass a separate, a reciprocal, a direct, or an inserted
decree, do in reality present nothing which can fairly or in any
way be considered as an exception to this general rule.

But where two or more persons have been bound by the contract
upon which the suit has been brought, and one of them pleads the
Statute of Limitations in bar, it has been said, that an acknow-
ledgment made, within the limited time, of its then existing valid-
ity by such defendant, or by any other of his co-defendants, will
take the case out of the statute. The adjudications in relation to
this matter are various and contradictory. Therefore, without
attempting to reconcile them, it will be sufficient to trace out the
reason of the law so lar as it is believed to be properly applicable
to this and all such cases in equity.

To constitute a valid contract of any description, it is indispen-
sably necessary that the parties should be competent to contract;
and being so competent, that they should all of them, in the man-
ner prescribed by law, understandiiigly have given their free con-
sent to the contract in question. In general, when the contract
purports to be the obligation or promise of two or more persons,
it must be shewn, that each one of them distinctly gave his con-
sent to it, and thereby actually and in terms for himself became
so * bound. But where there exists a partnership in trade,
each partner may make certain contracts in the name of the
whole which shall be obligatory alike upon all the partners. Now,
in all such cases, any one of the contractors may satisfy the entire
demand of the contract; and upon its terms being wholly com-
plied with by any one of them, it is thereby totally extinguished
and ceases to be any longer obligatory upon any one of them in
favor of him to whom it was given. That a contract may be
w^holly satisfied by any one of the contractors, and when so satis-
fied is thereby totally extinguished as to all, is a principle of law
so obviously rational and just, that it need only to be stated to be
universally admitted.

Consequently it is equally manifest, that any renewment of a
contract, which has been thus satisfied, barred or extinguished,
can only be effected by the exercise of a similar capacity to con-
tract to that which had been called forth for its original formation.
Suppose then, the alleged cause of suit to be an agreement where-
by all the defendants had bound themselves to pay to the plaintiff
a certain sum of money. In support of such a cause of suit it is
necessary to prove, that each one of the defendants, by his ex-