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256 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.— 1 BL.AND.
of time must be prescribed in order to give quiet to human affairs;
and as affording ground to presume, without the power of contra-
diction, that the alleged cause of controversy, either never existed
at all, or that if it did once actually exist, it had been in some
way finally adjusted and satisfied. 1 Stark. Er. 33; 4 Stark. Ev.
1234; Smith \. Clay, 3 Bro. C. C. 039, note. This principle of
* limitation, under one or other name or form, is to be found
273 in all codes of law. It is a rule, which, as to some cases, is
prescribed m positive terms by the Legislature, while as to others
it is the result of usage or judicial decisions; but in all instances
the lapse of time specified, as applicable to the case, gives a rule
by which all Courts of justice are bound. The Statute of Limita-
tions does not apply in terms to proceedings in Courts of equity;
it applies to particular actions at common law, and limits the time
within which they shall be brought, according to the nature of
those actions; but it docs not say there shall be no recovery in any
other mode of proceeding. If the equitable title be not sued
upon within the time within which a legal title of the same nature
ought to be sued upon, to prevent the bar created by the statute,
the Court acting by analogy to the statute, will not relieve. If
the party be guilty of such laches in prosecuting his equitable title
as would bar him, if his title were solely at law, he shall be barred
in equity: that is all the operation this statute has or ought to
have on proceedings in equity. Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Scho. & Lefr.
428; Slachouse v. Banston, 10 Ves. 466: Shipbrooke v. Hinching-
brook, 13 Ves. 396; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. 139;
Christophers v. Sparkle, 2 Jac. & Walk. 233; The Rebecca, 5 Rob.
Ad. Rep. 104; Morgan v. Davis, 2 H.& McH. 17.
But at law, as well as in equity, there are various peculiarities,
which have been held to be sufficient to take a case out of the
operation of the rule. They are either such as have been omitted
to be noticed in the statute itself; 4 Bac. Abr. 472; or they are
such as the statute has expressly specified; or they are such as
arise out of facts and circumstances,—as where the Courts of jus-
tice have been closed by some great national calamity; Co. Litt.
249: or where the parties stand in the relation to each other of
trustee and centui que trust; 4 Bac. Abr. 473; or where the party,
by omitting to plead or ask in his answer the benefit of the Sta-
tute of Limitations, thereby tacitly admits, that the rule cannot
or need not be applied to his case; Prince v. Heylin, 1 Atk. 494;
or where, by an express declaration or acknowledgment admitting
the claim, he thereby renews the contract or cause of suit, and
thus tacitly admits that his case is not within the terms of the
rule. Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & 6. 213. In all cases where this
Court, having cognizance of the whole case, finds it unconscion-
able to suffer the Statute of Limitations to be applied, it will be
disregarded; and in all other cases, of which this Court does
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