254 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND.

PL 104. So that in whatever way this answer of English and
wife is taken, as nothing therein set forth, as coming from her,
can affect his interest; and as he professes, so far as he answers
for himself, to know nothing of the matter, the several parts of it,
which so distinctly profess to be the allegations of each, may safely
and most advantageously for each be treated as if they had been
set forth in regular and entirely separate answers from each of
them.

Taking this answer in this way, then, it appears, that the de-
fendant David English, without expressly denying any thing,
admits nothing; but puts the whole of the plaintiff's case in issue.
His defence goes to the very origin, foundation and existence of
the plaintiff's whole cause of suit; and, therefore, it behooves
them to sustain their whole case in every way against him,
or they must totally fail. The defendant Lydia, in effect,
admits the original foundation of the plaintiff's cause of suit; but,
by way of avoidance, considering it as a contract of bargain and
sale of a tract of land, avers, in substance, that the purchase
money, in the modes therein described, has been paid and fully
satisfied. This defence, * being one by which she confesses
271 and avoids the cause of suit, it lays upon her to prove her
allegations in avoidance; or otherwise, if the plaintiffs sustain
their cause against the broad defence of her husband David, they
must be relieved as prayed against both of them. Again, the de-
fendant Richard Henderson pleads the Statute of Limitations; by
the form of which he, in substance, avers, that, although the cause
of suit might have once existed; yet, as the original contract had not
been in any way renewed by any recent acknowledgment or prom-
ise, it has been altogether barred by the prescribed lapse of time.
If this be a plea properly applicable to the nature of this case,
and if it be in fact true, then, as it goes to the whole cause of suit,
and shows that it has been totally barred, the plaintiffs can have
no relief whatever.

It is perfectly clear, therefore, from what has been said, that if
either one of these three defences be sustained, the plaintiffs can
have no relief; and that their bill must be dismissed with costs,
notwithstanding it might otherwise have been taken pro confesso
against the two defendants who have made default.

The plaintiffs have stated their case with a double aspect, so as
to entitle themselves to relief in either of the alternatives upon
which they rely. They have rested their case upon its being con-
sidered either as a conveyance in trust, or as a bargain and sale,
leaving the purchase money unpaid. They have stated their case
in this way, as they believe it to have been; but as a reason for
not being more exact in every particular, they say, " of this, or of
the terms of the contract, if any, they have not been able to dis-
cover any positive proof;" and thus admit, that their statements