HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 217

duced as a substitute for a fine; and although a deed of bargain
and sale, so acknowledged, will not, like a fine, as relates to the
interests of third persons, work a discontinuance, Lawrence v.
Heister, 3 H. & J. 377; Maysow's .Lessee v. Sexton, 1 H. & McH.
275; Nicholson's Lessee v. Hemsley, 3 H. & McH. 409, yet as re-
gards the feme covert herself it as effectually, and to a like
extent, passes her interest as a tine. Colegate D. Owings' Case,
post. Hence an acknowledgment of a feme covert, made accord-
ing to the Act of Assembly, like that made on levying a fine, can
operate only so far, and no farther, than the deed itself, to which
it is annexed, would operate, according to its nature, supposing it
to have been made by the husband before the marriage, or by her-
self alone while sole.

It is, therefore, my opinion, that the acknowledgment of this
plaintiff* to the lease to Bryden, can only be construed as an im-
provement and further security to Bryden's title; and that, on the
death of Samuel Chase, the plaintiff became immediately entitled
to dower in the reversion of the Fountain Inn; and also in the rent
reserved by that lease, without delay of execution during the term.

At law, the widow can recover damages or mesne profits for the
detention of her dower only from the time it was actually demanded
of the heir. And if the jury fail to assess damages for the deten-
tion, she can recover no costs; because costs are given only where
damages are recovered. William v. Gwyn, 2 Saund. 45, note; Pow.
Mort. 71S, note P; 2 Harr. Ent. 698. But in equity it is otherwise;
here it is the course of the Court to assign her dower, and universally
to give her an account of the rents and profits from the death of
her husband. But where the heir throws no difficulties in her
way, and admits her claim, she has no costs. Curtis v. Curtis, 2
Bro. C. C. 632; Dormer v. Fortesque. 3 AtJc. 130. In this case,
however, it appears, that every possible opposition has been made
to this plaintiff's claim. Lucas v. Catcraft,l Bro. C. C. 134; Wor-
gan v. Ryder, 1 Ves. & Bea. 20; 2 Nad. Chan. 564. As to the value
of the rents and profits, one-third of the rent reserved by the lease

Lord Proprietary on every such transfer here also, as it appears, constituted
a considerable portion of his revenue.—Cassell v. Cm-roll, 11 Wheat. 134.

The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immov-
able property, says an enlightened philosopher, as it gives great security to
both creditors and purchasers, is extremely advantageous to the public.—
Smith's W. Nations, b. 5, c. 2, app. to art. 1 and 2. Yet an eminent English
lawyer has delivered it as his settled conviction, that a general registry,
throughout England, -would entail a great and certain expense on property
for a very uncertain beaeflt. Because a general registry wantonly exposes
the concerns of all mankind; and by the negligence of aa agent, a purchaser
or mortgagee may lose the estate, if the seller or mortgagor fraudulently
sell or mortgage to another person whose deed is the first registered, and
questions upon the priority of registered deeds often lead to litigation.—Sug-
den's Letters on Sales, &c. 47.