HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 205

permitted, by way of plea, to aver, that he ought not to be com-
pelled to answer, as called upon in relation to any particular
matter, and at the same time to put his defence, as to the same
matter, into the form of such an answer as the bill calls for.
Hence if a defendant answers to any thing as to which he has
pleaded, he thereby overrules his plea; for his plea is only why he
should not answer, so that if he answers he waives his plea to the
same matter. The same principle is equally applicable to demur-
ring and answering, and to demurring and pleading to the same
part. Gilb. For. Rom. 58; Mitf. Tr. 320; Beams' PL Equ. 39.
The plea of these defendants must, therefore, be totally rejected;
as being overruled by the subsequent answer, covering exactly the
same matter; and I have the less hesitation in thus striking it out,
because it is evident, from the answer, that nothing at all neces-
sary to the sound merits of the defence will be lost.

But in the answer itself, of these defendants, there are matters
which may be safely banished from it without in the least enfee-
bling the force of the defence. That which is related of the matter
of the bill, filed on the 17th of February, 1813, by this plaintiff
and John P. Paca; what is said about the letter, and the convey-
ances from John E. Howard to the late Samuel Chase; what is
related of the late Samuel Chase's intentions to make advance-
ments of property to his children, and the allegations respecting
the rough draft of his will, with some other particulars of less
note, cannot certainly be at all material to the defence. I shall,
therefore, lay them aside, as in no way necessary to the present
matter in controversy.

* The defence rests on the following grounds:—first, that
the plaintiff has heretofore sued for dower iu this property,
and by the final termination of those suits her claim, if she ever
had any, has been fully released or barred; secondly, that if she
has not been thus solemnly barred, she is not in law dowable of
this property, because her late husband never had a fee simple
estate therein, but held only a mere equitable interest, as a mort-
gagee to secure the. payment of money lent by him; thirdly, sup-
posing these objections removed, that still her claim can be carried
no further back than to the 26th of February, 1821, when the lease
to Bryden and her relinquishment of dower up to that period ex-
pired; and lastly, supposing her claim to be valid, that yet the
two-thirds of this property, belonging to these defendants, can
neither be sold nor sequestered as a means of satisfying the
amount of the rents and profits, which may be decreed to her.
These are the great points of defence. The nature and validity of
each of which must now be carefully considered and determined.

With regard to the first point. The defendants Samuel, Matilda,
and Ann claim this property, called the Fountain Inn, and allege,
that the plaintiff has released, or is barred of dower therein, by