JONES v. MAGILL.—1 BLAND. 191

in of the answer of the defendant John F. Gittings, and until
further order.

The defendant Magill, by his petition, referring to the previous
proceedings, stated, that the defendant Gittings, for a long time
previous to the filing of the bill, and then did reside out of the
limits of this State: which, as he believes, was known to the
plaintiff when she instituted this suit; and yet, she had not stated
the fact in her bill and prayed for an order of publication, in place
of a subpo?ua against him: whereupon the petitioner prayed, that
the plaintiff might be compelled to proceed against the defendant
Gittings without delay, &c.

the complainant for a final decision. Had the complainant made such a
submission, it would have amounted to a total abandonment of his applica-
tion for relief, because in case of such submission, as has already been said,
every part of the answer would be considered as admitted; and no part of
the bill, except what is admitted by the answer, would be of any avail. Of
course the decree would be for immediate dissolution and dismission of the
bill.

The injunction was granted on two grounds. The bill alleged, 1st, an
agreement in writing of the deceased to take only three per cent, interest,
instead of six, for which judgment is entered; 3d, the payment of a sum
for which no credit is given. The answer does not expressly deny the agree-
ment, although the defendants say they do not believe that it ever existed.
As to the payment, which is the most substantial ground, the answer says
not a syllable. How then is it possible, on the present motion, to expect an
order for dissolution.

The Chancellor has taken the trouble of giving a full explanation; because
it is his custom, aim, and wish, to have the principles and practice of this
Court understood, and particularly where some of the parties are not resi-
dents of this State.

As the counsel complains of delay, and mentions the anxiety of his clients
to obtain an early termination of this cause, the Chancellor must aver, that
little delay has proceeded from this Court. He will go further, as he con-
ceives he may do with propriety, and suggest what is proper to be done for
expediting the cause. The defendants may obtain a rule for further pro-
ceedings, &c. This will either oblige the complainant soon to take out a
commission, or will soon put him out of Court. And if a commission be
taken out, a little diligence and vigilance on the part of the defendants will
obtain an early return of the commission; or put it in their power to shew,
that delay is sought by the complainant.

Now in cases of injunction, obtained on filing the bill, the Chancellor has
always thought it his duty to discourage, as much as he could, consistently
with a fair administration of justice, all studied or needless delay on the
part of the complainant.

It is ordered, that the injunction in this cause heretofore issued, shall con-
tinue until final hearing or further order.

After which, on the 17th of December, 1803, by direction of the plaintiff,
the injunction was dissolved, and the bill dismissed with costs.